

istics. Much evidence—including results from Tetlock's own research (2, 3)—indicates that personal needs for order, structure, and closure are positively associated with conservatism, whereas openness, tolerance for ambiguity, and integrative complexity are positively associated with liberalism (4). Others deny that these associations are important or consequential (5). Given the strong overlap in how the fox-hedgehog dimension and these other variables are measured, there is a missed opportunity to investigate in detail the effects of ideology (as mediated by cognitive style) on judgment and prediction. Tetlock suggests that his fox-hedgehog dimension is unrelated to the left-right ideological dimension, but he does not provide direct or sufficient information bearing on the nature of their association.

Nevertheless, as Tetlock points out, the ideological range of his expert sample may not have been wide enough to adequately test the “rigidity-of-the-right” hypothesis. And in any case, it does seem likely that leftists would be better predictors in some domains and rightists in others. Given that people see the future (at least in part) as they would like it to be, an answer to the question of whether liberals or conservatives are more accurate in their predictions depends upon, among other things, whether the world happens to turn to the left or right during the specified time period.

Tetlock does illustrate, quite cleverly, the effects of ideology on perceptions of historical counterfactuals. Whereas conservatives were convinced that the Soviet Union would not have changed without external pressure from the West (and liberals were more optimistic about internally generated reform), liberals believed that apartheid would not have ended without Western sanctions (and conservatives found it more likely that change could have come purely from within South Africa). Taking a staple from classic social psychology, Tetlock concludes that, “The operative principle is dissonance reduction: the more we hate a regime, the more repugnant it becomes to attribute anything good to redemptive dispositions of the regime (such as a capacity for self-correction).”

The strength of the analysis presented in *Expert Political Judgment* lies in the author's carving out the copious space between normative standards of prediction captured by complex equations requiring difficult-to-calculate base rates and statistical modeling of stochastic processes, on one hand, and descriptive evidence concerning the actual predictions made not merely by ordinary human beings but by the most talented experts among us, on the other. To fill in that space, Tetlock adroitly wields a succession of theories and findings from social and cognitive psychology. In the process he advances considerably the important work begun by Daniel Kahneman and

Amos Tversky (6), demonstrating just how desperately we need a scientific psychology of judgment and decision-making to correct for the many failings of a ruminating species.

References

1. See, e.g., D. M. Webster, A. W. Kruglanski, *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **67**, 1049 (1994).
2. P. E. Tetlock, *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **45**, 118 (1983).
3. P. E. Tetlock, *J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.* **46**, 365 (1984).
4. J. T. Jost, J. Glaser, A.W. Kruglanski, F. Sulloway, *Psychol. Bull.* **129**, 339 (2003).
5. J. Greenberg, E. Jonas, *Psychol. Bull.* **129**, 376 (2003).
6. D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, *Econometrica* **47**, 263 (1979).

10.1126/science.1129403

SOCIOLOGY

Fishing Rights and Race Relations

Nicholas J. G. Winter

Scholarship on whites' opinions on matters of race in America has been fueled by an apparent contradiction. On the one hand, there has been a dramatic long-term trend among whites away from support for overt racism. On the other hand, support for policies intended to address racial inequities—such as school busing or affirmative action—has not increased. There is a disjunction between genuine support for the abstract principle of racial equality and ambivalence or opposition to policies that seem logically connected to that principle.

The literature provides three basic explanations for this pattern. The first suggests that many whites oppose these policies not for racial motives but because they see such interventions as undermining cherished American values such as individualism (1, 2). If so, the contradiction between support for racial equality and opposition to policies is only apparent, because that opposition is not ultimately racial. The other two approaches draw attention to the role of race, but in rather different ways. The realistic group conflict school suggests that white opposition to policies is based importantly in material racial group interest: when policies hurt whites as a group, whites oppose them (3, 4). The symbolic racism school argues that although whites no longer generally endorse traditional anti-black stereotypes, a new form of racism has evolved that condemns blacks and other subordinate racial groups for

their perceived failure to live up to American values like individualism and the work ethic (5, 6). This new symbolic racism represents a blending of anti-black feelings with these values. There is long-running debate among proponents of these approaches—and important variants of all three—that has turned on questions of theory, measurement, and statistical methodology.

Prejudice in Politics moves beyond the traditional focus on black-white relations to explore these questions in the context of the controversy over Chippewa fishing and hunting rights in northern Wisconsin. Litigation over the treaties that ensure these rights ran from the mid-1970s through the early 1990s and spawned an intense and extended period of racial conflict. Lawrence Bobo and Mia Tuan (sociologists at Stanford University and the University of Oregon, respectively) offer an important contribution to the racial attitudes literature. The book is also an excellent resource for a broader audience interested in the continuing role of race and racism in American society and politics.

Drawing on sociologist Herbert Blumer's classic work on race relations (7), Bobo and Tuan develop a “group position” model of racial attitudes that integrates aspects of both the group conflict and the symbolic racism approaches. They take seriously the role of individual-level prejudice, while also arguing convincingly that the social, historical, and

political processes that create and institutionalize racial group differences are important in determining racial attitudes. They argue that racial groups are more than “mere” groups: they are an important way that society allocates rights to “scarce and socially valued goods and resources.” The construction and maintenance of racial categories are important ways that appropriate roles, rewards, and

outcomes are delineated in society. When that system is threatened symbolically—as in the treaty rights dispute—reactions by the dominant group can be strong and well out of proportion to the actual material threat, which was, in fact, minimal in this case. Bobo and Tuan's compelling theoretical development is pleasingly accessible to those not versed in the literature on racial attitudes. At the same time the authors provide signals (and references) that allow specialists to place their approach in the context of the broader literature.

The empirical heart of the book is based on a 1990 public opinion survey of Wisconsin residents, which allows Bobo and Tuan to document white opinion (8) on this serious racial

Prejudice in Politics
Group Position, Public Opinion, and the Wisconsin Treaty Rights Dispute

by Lawrence D. Bobo and Mia Tuan

Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 2006. 288
pp. \$40, £25.95, €36.90.
ISBN 0-674-01329-8.

The reviewer is at the Department of Politics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA. E-mail: nwinter@virginia.edu



Prejudiced response. Efforts by the Chippewa to exercise their treaty rights to spearfishing in northern Wisconsin met with racially charged protests from whites.

dispute. The data also allow them to develop measures of the key constructs from each of the three contending racial attitudes models. Their results compellingly demonstrate the failure of the nonracial values approach to explain white opinion. The authors present a series of statistical analyses that demonstrate the impact of racial predispositions on opinion, above and beyond individual demographic characteristics. They also make excellent and extensive use of respondents' own words, from open-ended responses, to show the ways that white Wisconsin residents' reactions to the Chippewa and to treaty rights are deeply and subtly inflected with racial considerations. These findings underline the conclusion that matters of race are still very much a part of white Americans' political cognition.

The data are less able to distinguish between the group position and the symbolic racism models. Both models deal with racial prejudice, with important—though subtle—differences in their understanding of prejudice. Bobo and Tuan present compelling evidence that the empirical data are consistent with their group position model. As they acknowledge, however, the data are not incompatible with the symbolic politics model. I believe this is not a failure in their choice of this case study or in the development of their survey questions. Rather, the theoretical distinctions being drawn in the modern versions of these various explanations are fine enough that survey data are hard-pressed to distinguish among them. The measures of the building blocks of the models—stereotyping, group competition, political or group threat, symbolic racism, group affect—are too highly correlated to allow a convincing winner to emerge from head-to-head statistical competition. This means that the authors' ability to adjudicate between group position and symbolic racism models

turns importantly on a subtle reading of the open-ended data.

Despite this, *Prejudice in Politics* (along with work in the symbolic racism tradition) has important lessons for our understanding of American democracy broadly speaking. There is a long tradition, dating back at least to Alexis de Tocqueville and Gunnar Myrdal, of seeing white Americans' opposition to the advancement of racial "others" as mere irrational prejudice, fundamentally unconnected to the true essence of American culture, society, and politics. Bobo and Tuan show that whites' attitudes are to a considerable extent based on racial predispositions and that those predispositions represent far more than irrational individual dislike. Rather, Americans' racial attitudes connect importantly with the ways that racial categories are constructed and institutionalized in social structure and political conflict. In this sense, they are a fundamental—if distasteful—part of American society and culture.

References and Notes

1. P. M. Sniderman, T. L. Piazza, *The Scar of Race* (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993).
2. P. M. Sniderman, E. G. Carmines, *Reaching Beyond Race* (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997).
3. J. M. Glaser, *J. Polit.* **56**, 21 (1994).
4. L. Bobo, in *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, P. A. Katz, Ed. (Plenum, New York, 1988), pp. 85–116.
5. D. O. Sears, in *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, P. A. Katz, Ed. (Plenum, New York, 1988), pp. 53–84.
6. D. R. Kinder, L. M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996).
7. H. Blumer, *Pac. Sociol. Rev.* **1**, 3 (1958).
8. The authors report that they "were unable to sample opinions among any significant number of American Indians, including the Chippewa themselves."

10.1126/science.1129404

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Stoking the Voters' Passions

James N. Druckman

In its defense of the United States Constitution, *The Federalist Papers* make clear that input from citizens must be limited because they think too emotionally. *Federalist* 49 states, "The danger of disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society." Further on, toward the end of the essay, the author (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) concludes, "The passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be

controlled and regulated by the government" (1).

Over two centuries later, this view continues to be the conventional wisdom for many. Social scientists, however, have offered little insight into the role of emotion in shaping citizens' political decisions. Do emotions play a substantial role? If so, when? And is such

a role problematic? With each technological innovation in the mass media that offers politicians new means to play on the public's emotions, these questions become more pressing. It is such questions that frame the topics Ted Brader addresses in *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds*.

Brader, an assistant professor at the University of Michigan, begins by noting the development of two recent but largely distinct research programs in political science. One focuses on how mass communication affects citizens' opinions. Using content analyses, experiments, surveys, and case studies, social scientists from various disciplines have shown—not surprisingly—that what politicians and news sources say can shape what citizens think and believe. Another fairly recent body of work shows citizens' actions and opin-

Campaigning for Hearts and Minds

How Emotional Appeals in Political Ads Work

by Ted Brader

University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006. 296 pp. \$60, £38. ISBN 0-226-06988-5. Paper, \$24, £15.50. ISBN 0-226-06989-3. Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion.

The reviewer is at the Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Scott Hall, 601 University Place, Evanston, IL 60208, USA. E-mail: druckman@northwestern.edu