Masculine Republicans and Feminine Democrats: Gender and Americans' Explicit and Implicit Images of the Political Parties

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During the past three decades—as the parties have staked out distinct positions on women's rights and run gender-implicated campaigns—Americans have come to view the parties increasingly in gendered terms of masculinity and femininity. Utilizing 30 years of American National Election Studies data and the results of a cognitive reaction-time experiment, this paper demonstrates empirically that these connections between party images and gender stereotypes have been forged at the explicit level of the traits that Americans associate with each party, and also at the implicit level of unconscious cognitive connections gender and party stereotypes. These connections between the parties and masculinity have important implications for citizens' political cognition and for the study of American political behavior.

Since the early 1980s, the American political parties have polarized sharply on issues of women's rights, and issues of gender equality have become an element of the party alignment. While neither party has consistently emphasized gender issues during this period, Republicans have worked hard to shape popular images of the parties in terms of gendered stereotypes: they have positioned the Republicans as the masculine party of real men and the Democrats as the party of effeminate wimps. Arnold Schwarzenegger, for example, is particularly explicit in repeatedly calling Democrats "girlie-men."[1] These attacks draw on common gender stereotypes about men who do not fit masculine ideals to suggest that Democrats lack, and Republicans possess, traits like strength, toughness and aggressiveness—qualities important for political leadership. While these associations are typically evoked more subtly, they are nevertheless powerful because they draw not just on ideas about gender, but also build on citizens' existing ideas about issues and traits that are associated with the parties. These developments have important implications for citizens' views of the parties because gendered stereotypes about masculinity and femininity contain rich associations and shape social perception powerfully.

This paper demonstrates empirically that during the past three decades—as the parties have staked out distinct positions on women's rights and run gender-implicated campaigns—Americans have come to view the parties increasingly in gendered terms of masculinity and femininity. These connections between party images and gender stereotypes have been forged at the explicit level of traits that Americans associate with each party and also at the implicit level of unconscious cognitive connections gender and party stereotypes. This means that in Americans' minds, the Democrats are not simply the party of women's rights and compassion but are in essence the "female" party. Conversely, the Republican Party is not simply strong, aggressive and opposed to feminism, but also intrinsically "male" in a deeper psychological sense. That is, party images and gender images are not simply parallel stereotypes with shared content but rather

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[1] Schwarzenegger first deployed this phrase while campaigning for George H. W. Bush in 1988 and 1992, then again in 2004 as Governor of California in battles with the legislature, and most recently at the 2004 Republican national convention.

reflect both conscious associations and unconscious cognitive connections between the two domains. This means that gender stereotypes are centrally implicated in political cognition. When Americans think about the political parties and their candidates, all of their beliefs about gender, masculinity, and femininity become available to shape that thought, often outside of conscious awareness. This means that campaign rhetoric that evokes images of masculine leadership—or effeminate lack of leadership—will resonate powerfully for many citizens; it also means that gender stereotypes will interact with party stereotypes to shape voters' reactions to political campaigns, even when both candidates are men—or both are women.

The elite side of these developments has received considerable scholarly attention. Historians, legal theorists, and cultural studies scholars—as well as the mainstream media—have explored leaders' attempts to demonstrate their own masculinity and to undermine the perceived masculinity of their opponents (e.g. Fahey 2007; Bederman 1995; Hoganson 1998; Dean 2001; Jeffords 1994; Ducat 2004; Rich 2004). In political science, scholars of gender and the party system have shown that since 1980 the parties have polarized on issues of women's equality and on abortion, and to a lesser extent on other "women's" issues (Wolbrecht 2000; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Freeman 1987). Likewise, historians have traced the ways that disagreements over gender equality have become more closely linked with ideological conflict more generally (Spruill 2008).

We know very little, however, about how individual citizens have reacted to these shifts in the parties and the explicit and implicit gendering strategies they have deployed.[2] Rather, most work on gender and political behavior has focused on differences in issue attitudes and partisan identification between male

[2] There has been work on the relationship between the parties' issue positions and the public's issue attitudes and partisanship. Adams, for example, presents evidence that abortion in particular has precipitated some degree of mass partisan realignment (1997), and Sanbonmatsu shows that while the parties have polarized on abortion, party differences on a broad range of "women's" issues have been more varied and have not precipitated a broader partisan realignment (2002). None of this work directly addresses, however, the public's broader party images or the ways that ideas about gender, masculinity, and femininity have shaped those images. Conversely, Hayes has explored the traits that citizens associate with the parties, but without an explicit focus on the gendered nature of those trait attributions (2005).

and female citizens—the gender gap—or on differences in how people react to male and female candidates. The gender gap literature has traced political differences between men and women to differences in socialization, feminist or feminine values, maternal thinking, social location, and more (for overviews of this vast body of research, see Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte 2008; Sapiro 2003, 605-10). The candidate gender literature has demonstrated that gender stereotypes—which are central to person perception—can influence citizens' reactions to male and female candidates in important ways (for an overview see Dolan 2008). An important recent line of work in this literature explores the interactions between citizens' gender stereotypes and their party stereotypes in shaping perceptions of female candidates (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009; Huddy and Capelos 2002; Matland and King 2002; Hayes 2009).

However, gender stereotypes contain more than ideas about men and about women as homogenous groups; they also include rich ideas about subtypes of men and subtypes of women, which encompass ideas and strong feelings about masculinity and femininity (Eckes 1994; Deaux et al. 1985). Individuals vary in the degree to which they conform to stereotypical ideas of masculinity and femininity, and this variation has important consequences for perception and evaluation. Gender stereotypes are implicated in our ideas about what makes a "manly man" different from a "wimp"—or as Schwarzenegger might say, from a "girlie-man"—and gender stereotypes also include strong emotional and normative reactions to these sorts of images. Thus, gender stereotypes can powerfully shape citizen's perceptions and evaluations of candidates or leaders even when all are men (or all are women), insofar as those candidates and leaders are measured against yardsticks of masculinity and femininity.

This paper explores the ways that gendered ideas structure citizens' views on the contemporary Republican and Democratic parties. The association of the parties with masculinity and femininity has shaped the public image of the parties and sorts of traits people consciously associate with them; it has also forged subconscious connections between gender and party concepts so that thinking about the parties can subconsciously and automatically bring gender stereotypes to mind, and thereby shape political cognition in far reaching ways.

I employ a multi-tool, multi-method approach to establish these subtle connections. First, I employ nationally-representative survey data to document the explicit, public face of the gendering of the parties. Drawing on three decades of American National Election Studies (ANES) data, I demonstrate that citizens associate the parties with gendered—i.e., masculine and feminine—traits. These associations developed over the course of the 1980s and are most firmly established among politically engaged Americans. These over-time and cross-sectional patterns indicate that these gender-party connections were created by the changing public image of the parties and by Republican electoral strategies during this period. Second, to explore the implicit cognitive underpinnings of these party images, I present evidence from a computerized reaction-time experiment conducted in a virtual psychological laboratory. This evidence suggests that people do not merely ascribe to the Democrats and Republicans a series of traits that happen to be feminine and masculine. Rather, ideas about the parties are linked cognitively with ideas about gender. This means that when people think about the Democratic party, they draw directly—and unconsciously—on their concepts of femininity, and when people think about the Republican party, they draw on ideas about masculinity. While each of these two sources of evidence has limitations, they also possess important counterbalancing strengths: the survey data provide a nationally-representative picture of explicit party images over a long time period, while the experimental data allow us a glimpse of the much harder to observe cognitive underpinnings of those images.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss briefly American ideals of masculinity and discuss the ways that the parties have become associated with masculinity and femininity. Then, in the first of two empirical sections, I present data on the gendered traits that Americans associate with the political parties, drawing on ANES open-ended data. I follow this with the results of an experiment that demonstrates the implicit cognitive underpinnings of those associations. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for our understanding of the American political parties and for research on gender and political behavior. In particular, despite the general lack of explicitly gendered language in most political campaigns—except for the occasional comment from Schwarzenegger—and despite

the fact that most campaigns continue to pit two men against each other, implicit ideas about gender nevertheless structure citizens' reactions to them. The interconnected nature of party and gender stereotypes suggest that we need explore further the intersectional nature of these two categories, and in particular the ways that a candidate's party affiliation creates a context that shapes perceptions of their sex and of their embodiment of masculinity and femininity. Finally, I consider briefly how changes over time in the issue agenda might influence public reactions to these gendered party images.

Masculinity and femininity in American culture and politics

Modern American gender stereotypes have at their core a set of beliefs about the personality characteristics that men and women typically possess.[3] Most broadly, feminine stereotypes revolve around communal or interpersonal traits, while masculine stereotypes emphasize agency and achievement; from these traits grow prescriptions for appropriate roles and behavior for men and for women (e.g. Zemore, Fiske, and Kim 2000; Bem 1974). This basic configuration works to associate masculinity with politics and leadership. The very idea of a political or public realm is constructed in contrast with the private, and the public/private duality is deeply gendered, with the public sphere traditionally associated explicitly with men (e.g. Phillips 1991).[4] While formal gender segregation is now gone, both the political realm and leadership—in and out of politics—continue to have symbolically masculine connotations (Ridgeway 2001).

Strong leaders are expected to enact what Connell calls *hegemonic masculinity*, "the culturally idealized form of masculine character" (1990, 83; cited in Trujillo 1991, 290; Connell 2005; Kimmel 2006;

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[3] There is considerable cross-cultural consistency in gender stereotypes, amid important cultural variation; this consistency—and debates about its social or biological bases—are tangential to the purposes of this paper (see, e.g., Ortner 1974; Ortner 1996, chapter 7).

[4] Helen Haste argues that the idea of gender difference serves as a sort of master metaphor that gives meaning to myriad dualities at the center of Western culture, including public-private, rational-intuitive, active-passive, hard-soft, thinking-feeling, and many more (1993). In the American context, John Kang argues that efforts to develop a new model of manly identity, appropriate to a democracy, lay at the center of the construction of the American constitution (2009). On the role of gender ideals in the politics of the revolution and early republic, see Kerber (1986) and Bloch (1987).

Kimmel 1987; Gilmore 1990; Ducat 2004; Fahey 2007). Trujillo argues that hegemonic masculinity in American culture involves five interrelated characteristics: "physical force and control, occupational achievement, familial patriarchy, frontiersmanship, and heterosexuality" (1991, 291).[5]

The ideals of physical force and control require men to be strong, aggressive, and violent, while also exhibiting self-control and a "manly air of toughness, confidence, and self-reliance" (Kimmel 1987, 238). These somewhat contradictory imperatives are reconciled by emphasizing self-control in relation to women and other dependents while lauding aggressive violence against other men who pose a threat to those dependents—a pattern central to norms of chivalry.[6] This pattern, in turn, supports the ideal of familial patriarchy, which requires men to provide for women and dependents while protecting them from external threats, and further defines men as authoritarian fathers, husbands, and providers, while defining women as nurturing mothers, housewives, and sexual objects.

Hegemonic masculinity further emphasizes public status earned through success in competition with other men; this separates the masculine spheres of work and politics from the feminine sphere of home and family, and defines some sorts of work as more manly and other sorts as more womanly. Frontiersmanship, in turn, suggests daring adventure in which a man proves his manliness through independent and strenuous engagement with and dominance of nature; this imperative has its historical roots in the American frontier and it lives on in the image of the independent sportsman/hunter today. Finally, hegemonic masculinity encompasses an assumption of heterosexuality, which defines appropriate

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[5] Hegemonic masculinity is, of course, a social construction, and is therefore malleable over the medium to long historical term. There are always subordinate, competing views of masculinity and femininity that critique the normative status of the hegemonic ideal; this leads Connell, for example, to emphasize the *masculinities* rather than a single homogenous concept (Connell 2005). In particular, the feminist and gay liberation movements have both reshaped somewhat traditional ideas about gender relations and masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). On the ways that cultural ideas about gender are reproduced by the ways they structure behavior and social institutions, see Zimmerman and West (1987) and, more broadly, Lorber (1991).

[6] Kristin Hoganson traces the ways that these chivalric ideals shaped politics and policymaking at the turn of the twentieth century (1998); see also Bederman (1995), and Nisbett and Cohen make a similar argument about the role of "honor" in the culture of the American South (1996).

relations with other men as competitive and proper relations with women as intimate and sexual. The norms of heterosexuality also serve to associate homosexuality with the feminine, and by extension to associate any shortcomings of hegemonic masculinity with questionable heterosexuality and therefore with femininity.[7]

Finally, it should be noted that stereotypes of masculinity also include some negative attributes. Thus, for example, stereotypes of men include characteristics such as greedy, hostile, and self-interested, in addition to positive characteristics such as competent, decisive, and confident. In addition, some aspects of masculinity, such as aggressiveness and violence, can take on negative connotations when they appear to be excessive or when applied to an undeserving target (Spence, Helmreich, and Holahan 1979; Spence, Helmreich, and Helmreich 1978).

Republicans and Democrats become masculine and feminine

The links among ideas about gender, leadership, and hegemonic masculinity should cause political contests, especially for executive positions, to evoke concerns of masculinity. When voters ask themselves what sort of leader a candidate will be, that question will evoke to some extent the question of how manly the candidate is. Interestingly, Carlson and Boring present experimental evidence that male and female candidates are rated as more masculine and less feminine when described as winning, rather than losing (1981). Thus, male and female candidates may both be judged in terms of a set of stereotypically masculine attributes. As Hayes points out, campaigns are typically *not* framed as a "battle of the sexes" even when a man and a woman run against each other (2009). Nevertheless, campaigns may often involve an implicit battle of *manliness*, in which candidates of both sexes attempt to demonstrate their masculine credentials.

[7] There is an extensive literature in social psychology showing that masculine and feminine traits do not form a single bipolar dimension at the individual level (Constantinople 2005); rather, both are multidimensional constructs that vary independently (Bem 1974; Spence, Helmreich, and Helmreich 1978). Nevertheless, the cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity treat each as a coherent package that is defined in opposition to the other. "Feminine" is thus understood as "not masculine" and vice-versa (Foushee, H. Clayton, Helmreich, and Spence 1979).

There are five interrelated developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s that have mapped masculinity and femininity—already important for politics—onto the Republican and Democratic Parties, respectively. First, as I mention above, Wolbrecht documents the polarization of party elites over the Equal Rights Amendment and other issues of women's equality in the late 1970s. In the early 1970s, the Republican party was modestly *more* supportive of women's rights than the Democrats, though neither party devoted much attention to the issue. By 1980, the parties had staked out the positions they hold today, and differences over women's rights have become an important feature of the elite-level party alignment. These differences are reflected in stark differences in party platforms, in bill sponsorship rates, and in roll-call votes, leading Wolbrecht to suggest that "the lines have thus been drawn with considerable clarity since 1980" (2000, 6). Wolbrecht also documents that media coverage of women's issues also increased as the parties polarized. These partisan patterns were further reinforced by the growing role within the Republican coalition of the social conservative movement, which was galvanized by the ERA, by Roe vs. Wade, and by perceptions of breakdowns in traditional gender arrangements (Spruill 2008).

These developments have been reinforced by the symbolic gender associations of the issues "owned" by each of the political parties. There is considerable overlap between the political issues associated with the parties, on the one hand, and the issues associated with men and women, on the other. Republicans are thought to handle better such issues as defense, controlling crime and drugs, and the economy (Petrocik 1996); these are precisely the issues that Americans associate with men or with masculine traits (Kahn 1996; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Conversely, Democratic-owned issues such as social welfare, public education, the environment, and promoting peace are all also associated with women or with femininity.

Third, these parallel party and gender issue competencies are reflected in and reinforced by the gender gap in issue attitudes and party identification (e.g. Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Gilens 1988; for an overview of the enormous gender gap literature, see Sapiro 2003). The gender gap first achieved sustained public attention after the 1980 election, as the result of an effort by women's groups to increase their

influence within the Democratic Party (Mansbridge 1985), and has been a fixture of media coverage of presidential campaigns ever since. While the size and consistency of the gender gap is often overstated in the popular media (Ladd 1997), coverage of the gap likely serves to reinforce for the public the association of the Republican party with men and the Democratic party with women.

Fourth, linguist George Lakoff has argued that conservatives and liberals—and by extension the Republican and Democratic parties—operate in different, and metaphorically gendered, moral universes. In Lakoff's account, different approaches to the appropriate role of the government metaphorically evoke different views on parenting: the Republicans are the party of the strict father, while the Democrats are the party of the nurturing mother (Lakoff 2002).

Finally, the Republican Party has had considerable success framing recent presidential campaigns symbolically in terms of masculinity and gender. Through the 1960s, the Democratic party—and specifically Presidents Kennedy and Johnson—cultivated an image of potent masculinity.[8] However, Susan Jeffords argues that "Ronald Reagan and his administration [portrayed] themselves as distinctively masculine, not merely men but as decisive, tough, aggressive, strong, and domineering men . . . Ronald Reagan became the premier masculine archetype of the 1980s" (1994, 11). Following Reagan's lead, since 1980, Republican presidential candidates have generally associated themselves with masculinity and their opponents with femininity. They have done so through strategies that combine policy and character, marrying claims about Democratic softness (and Republican toughness) on defense, crime, and other symbolically masculine issues with suggestions that the Democratic candidates themselves were insufficiently tough, aggressive, and decisive (e.g. Wahl-Jorgensen 2000; Malin 2005; Fahey 2007; Ducat 2004; Berlant and Duggan 2001).

In sum, these interrelated developments all conspire to associate the Republican Party with men and masculinity and the Democratic Party with women and femininity. These gendered associations have

[8] On the masculine culture of cold-war foreign policymaking, and the efforts by Kennedy, Johnson, and those in their milieu to construct and project a masculine image, see Dean (2001) and Johnson (2004).

their foundation in political issues that deal explicitly with questions of gender, and are reinforced through recent political campaigns and other public discourse surrounding the parties. Because our ideas about gender are very rich and very easily mobilized to shape our social cognition, we should expect these associations to have profound effects on both explicit and implicit images of the parties. In the sections that follows I explore empirically these effects, first on the gendered traits that Americans associate explicitly with the parties, and second on the implicit cognitive connections with gender that make those images particularly potent.

Gendered traits explicitly associated with the contemporary parties

This first analysis explores the gendered trait associations contained in Americans' images of the contemporary political parties over the past three decades, drawing on the ANES open-ended questions about respondents' likes and dislikes about the political parties. In each pre-election study, the ANES asks respondents to mention up to five things they like and an additional five things they dislike about each of the political parties, along with parallel questions about each major-party presidential candidates (in presidential years), and each of the major-party House candidates in their district. The analysis in this paper focuses on the political parties—up to 20 distinct mentions per respondent. The ANES does not report respondents' actual remarks; rather, each remark is coded into one of 699 "party-candidate master codes" or categories. These like/dislike question batteries were included—with consistent coding of the open-ended remarks—beginning with the 1972 study.[9] Because the likes and dislikes battery was excluded in a number of non-presidential years, my analysis focuses on presidential years between 1972 and 2004.[10]

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[9] The categories are listed in the appendix to the ANES cumulative file dataset. The mentions are in variables VCF0375A-VCF0379A (Democratic party likes), VCF0381A-VCF0385A (Democratic dislikes), VCF0387A-VCF0391A (Republican likes), and VCF0393A-VCF0397A (Republican dislikes). In 1972 the ANES reported only the first *three* mentions for each target, although up to five were collected in the interview. The 1972 dataset does report how *many* mentions each respondent made, up to five; this indicates that about two percent of respondents mentioned more than three things in a each category. Restricting the analysis in other years to only the first three mentions does not

The analysis focused on stereotypical masculine and feminine traits.[11] The ANES party and candidate master codes were classified as masculine if they refer to traits or characteristics that are associated in contemporary American gender stereotypes with men or masculinity, and classified as feminine if they refer to traits or characteristics that are associated with women or femininity. References to political issues and to social groups were *not* coded as masculine or feminine. The ANES codes were classified independently by the author and two graduate student research assistants, both of whom were familiar with the gender stereotypes literature but were blind to the hypotheses of this study. After classifying the codes independently, the three coders met together to discuss differences and ambiguous cases and came to agreement on final classification of each code.[12]

Both positive and negative traits were classified; for example, masculine traits include both references to being statesmanlike, energetic, or efficient, and also references to such negative traits as being cold or being selfish as well as references to sex scandals. Feminine traits included kind, gentle, and compassionate as well as weak and indecisive. In all, 37 codes were categorized as masculine (22 positive, 15 negative) and 26 as feminine (eight positive, 18 negative); the complete listing appears in the appendix.[13]

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affect the patterns of results in those years, which suggests that the omission of the fourth and fifth mentions in 1972 probably does not substantially influence the patterns observed in that year.

[10] The patterns are not any different in the non-presidential years for which party likes and dislikes are available.

[11] Both issues and political groups can be understood to have both literal and more symbolic gender associations as well. As I discuss in the conclusion, an important area for additional future research is the ways that the gendered trait associations of the parties interact with and reinforce their group and issue associations.

[12] The kappa statistic for inter-rater agreement among the three raters was substantial: 0.76 for masculine traits and 0.75 for feminine traits (Cohen 1960; Landis and Koch 1977).

[13] The raw number of codes classified as gendered in a particular category is not particularly meaningful, as the codes themselves vary in their specificity and by several orders of magnitude in how often they actually appear in the data.

Analyses are based on tallies of all mentions, separately for each of the four types (Democratic party likes, Democratic party dislikes, Republican party likes, and Republican party dislikes).[14]

The unit of analysis is the mention, meaning that I exclude respondents who gave no mentions at all, and also respondents who gave no mentions of a particular type. That is, when examining Democratic Party Likes, I analyze the universe of mentions in that category, and therefore exclude respondents who had nothing positive to say—gendered or not—about the Democratic party. This has the effect, of course, of yielding a more informed and engaged sample than the nation as a whole, and of weighting more heavily the views of those respondents who gave more mentions in a particular category. This is appropriate for the purpose of this paper, which is to examine the gendered nature of the parties' aggregate images and the ways in which impressions of the parties are tied to gendered traits.[15] In presidential years from 1972 through 2004, there were a total of 55,127 things mentioned as likes or dislikes for the parties, and 72 percent of respondents mentioned at least one "like" or "dislike" about at least one of the parties.[16]

Americans associate gendered traits with the parties

Table 1 shows the percentage of all party likes and party dislikes mentioned by respondents that were masculine, as well as the ratio of masculine mentions between the two parties. This table indicates that Americans mention masculine traits much more often when thinking about the Republican Party, exactly

[14] The distinction between positive and negative traits was collapsed for the analysis, so stereotypically masculine traits that are culturally sanctioned (e.g., independent, code 315) and those that are not (e.g., cold or aloof, code 438) were both classified simply as masculine, and normatively positive and negative feminine traits (e.g., kind, code 435 versus indecisive, code 304) were all classified as feminine. In practice, the overwhelming majority of respondents' party likes were normatively positive traits, and dislikes were overwhelmingly negative, although there were a few exceptions. For example, a small handful of respondents indicated in 2004 that they liked the fact that the Democratic party lacked a definite philosophy (code 836). This example makes clear that a trait that is often considered a weakness can be a political asset in the right political context, a point to which I return in the conclusion.

[15] Reassuringly, the pattern of results is essentially unchanged when multiple mentions by a single individual are collapsed, which reframes the analysis in terms of the proportion of respondents who mention gendered traits, rather than the proportion of mentions.

[16] This ranged from a low of 66 percent in 1980 to a high of 77 percent in 2004. Overall, 48 percent of respondents mentioned something they like and 40 percent mentioned something they dislike about the Democrats; the corresponding percentages for Republicans were 39 and 46.

as I expect. Likes are tallied in the first column of the table, which shows that masculine traits are almost five times more likely to be mentioned as a reason to like the Republican than as a reason to like the Democratic Party. Masculine traits make up 10.7 percent of the things people mention as reasons to like the Republican Party, compared with 2.2 percent of things they like about the Democratic Party (all of the partisan differences are statistically significant, $p<0.001$). The second column tallies dislikes, and depicts a somewhat more muted version of the same pattern: masculine traits are about 50 percent more likely to be mentioned as reasons to dislike the Republican Party than to dislike the Democratic Party.

========== Table 1 Here ==========

Turning to feminine traits, table 2 presents the analogous analysis of feminine traits; here we observe the mirror image of the partisan patterns in table 1. When thinking about reasons to like the Democratic Party, Americans are almost seven times as likely to mention feminine traits as they are when thinking about the Republican party—4.4 percent of Democratic likes are feminine traits, compared with less than one percent of Republican likes. Similarly, feminine traits are over four times as likely to be mentioned as reasons to dislike the Democrats as they are as reasons to dislike the Republican Party (4.4 percent versus 1.0 percent, respectively).

These results strongly confirm my expectations about gendered trait associations for the political parties: Americans view the Republican party in terms of masculine traits and the Democratic party in terms of feminine traits. It is worth noting as well that gendered traits represent a fairly substantial portion of the overall party image of each party. We can put the raw percentages of gendered trait mentions in in context by noting that a very large percentage of the things people like and dislike about the parties—about 72 percent—relate to issues, to groups, or to individuals associated with the parties.[17] Thus, while gendered

[17] Overall, 45.1 percent of mentions related to issues, 21.2 percent to groups, and 5.2 percent to individuals. The proportions in these categories varied somewhat by party: for the Democratic Party, 76.6 percent of likes and 62.1 percent of dislikes fell in one of those three categories, as did 70.4 percent of Republican Party likes and 75.0 percent of Republican Party dislikes.

traits do not dominate party impressions, they represent a sizeable and substantively important fraction of the things people have to say about the parties.

Current gendered party associations developed in the 1980s

Having documented the basic gendered patterns of party trait associations in the modern era, I turn now to the emergence of these associations over time. As I discuss above, by 1980 party elites had polarized on gendered issues and in subsequent years the messages about the parties that the public received served to associate the parties with gender, both explicitly in terms of the issues they represented and more symbolically in campaign portrayals. Insofar as those public messages affected the public views on the parties, we should expect the patterns of gendered trait associations to develop through the 1980s.

Figure 1, therefore, shows the development of these patterns over time. It displays the percentage of masculine and feminine party mentions, separately for each year between 1972 and 2004. The patterns of change over time are consistent with what we would expect as the public has been exposed to gendering images through the past three decades. The top-left panel of figure 1 shows the proportion of masculine traits among each party's "likes." It indicates that the association of the Republicans with masculine traits jumped sharply from 6.2 percent of likes in 1972 to 12.0 percent in 1980, and has since varied between about 10 and 15 percent of all likes. Meanwhile, the Democratic party has drawn a much lower—and essentially unchanging—proportion of masculine trait likes over the entire period. The pattern of masculine dislikes is less clear over time; as in the aggregate figures reported in table 1, the Republican party draws somewhat more masculine trait dislikes than the Democrats, although the differences are relatively smaller and show no particular trend over time.[18]

========== Figure 1 Here ==========

[18] The slight jumps in masculine Democratic dislikes in 1992 and especially 2000 are driven mostly by references to sex scandals (code 719).

The mirror-image of this pattern holds for feminine traits, as I expect. In the bottom panels of figure 1, we see that the feminization of the Democratic party—in terms of both likes and dislikes—first begins to appear in 1980, and is solidified in 1984, after which it remains fairly steady over time. There is a jump in feminine dislikes in 2004, driven in part by a spike in references to the party lacking a definite philosophy (ANES code 836).[19] Over this period, the Republican party draws a consistent—and consistently tiny—set of feminine trait likes and dislikes.

Politically engaged citizens are most prone to hold gendered impressions of the parties

The gendered themes in the discourse around the parties appears to have been absorbed by the public over the 1980s and is reflected in the ways they evaluate the parties. Turning from over-time to cross-sectional variation, I expect that citizens who are most engaged with politics will have absorbed these gendered party images more completely than those who are less engaged. Beyond political engagement, however, I expect the gendered party images to be held relatively homogenously among different members of the American public. In particular, I do *not* expect systematic differences between men and women, nor among independents, Democrats, and Republicans.

As I discuss above, much of the public discourse around gender and the parties is relatively symbolic. Most citizens, therefore, will not necessarily recognize the gendered nature of messages they encounter about the parties and will, therefore, not be in a position to accept or reject those messages based on their gendered contents. (Nor, for that matter, would they necessarily have any reason to reject these gendering messages even if they did recognize them as such.) Following Zaller and others who have explored the effects of political discourse on opinion, I expect, therefore, that those who are more politically engaged will absorb these messages the most (Zaller 1992; Converse 1990). Therefore, I expect political engagement to increase the probability of a respondent mentioning a feminine trait as a reason to like or dislike the

[19] A reaction, perhaps, in general to the prominence of this theme in Republican campaigns in 2004, and in particular to the "flip-flopper" attacks on John Kerry.

Democratic party, and to increase the probability of mentioning a masculine trait as a reason to like or dislike the Republican party. Conversely, I do not expect engagement to influence the likelihood of mentioning the opposite, non-dominant gendered traits.

On the other hand, because Democrats, independents and Republicans are all exposed to the same gendered discourse about the parties and their candidates, I do not expect there to be important differences in gendering among citizens who identify with the Democratic or Republican parties. To be sure, different partisans have different images of the parties—in particular, Democratic identifiers generally have positive images of the Democratic party and negative images of the Republican party, and Republican identifiers have the opposite pattern. Nevertheless, I do not expect either Democrats or Republicans to be systematically different in their *gendering* of the parties. Insofar as Democrats have positive or negative things to say about the Republican party, for example, I expect them to be just as likely to mention masculine traits as Republican identifiers; conversely, Republican identifiers who have positive or negative things to say about the Democratic party should be as likely as Democrats to mention feminine traits. Finally, for similar reasons I expect men and women to hold similarly gendered images of the two parties.

I explore these individual-level hypotheses among respondents to the ANES studies from 1984 through 2004, which is the period during which the gendered party images were fully in place among the public as a whole. I ran a series of models of the individual-level antecedents of mentioning gendered traits about the parties. Specifically, I constructed a set of dichotomous variables that indicates whether each respondent mentioned a masculine or a feminine trait as a reason to like or to dislike each party—this yielded eight variables in all. Thus, for example, the first of these variables indicates whether a respondent mentioned a masculine trait as a reason to like the Democratic party; the second indicates whether a respondent mentioned a masculine trait as a reason to dislike the Democratic party, and so forth.

I ran a series of probit models, one for each of these eight dependent variables. The independent variables are political engagement, as assessed by the ANES interviewers (coded to run from zero for the least informed to one for the most informed), party identification (entered as a pair of dummy variables: one for

Democratic identifiers and one for Republican identifiers, with independents as the reference category), and gender (entered as a dummy variable for women, with men as the omitted category), as well as a dummy variables for each study year.[20] I ran each model among all respondents who gave at least one mention, gendered or not, of the relevant type; thus, for example, the model for mentioning a feminine "like" about the Democratic Party included respondents who mentioned *some* reason to like the Democrats.[21]

Table 3 presents the results of these analyses for the Democratic party. The cell entries represent the marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability of mentioning a gendered trait, with standard errors in parentheses.[22] The first row gives the impact of political engagement on the probability of mentioning each sort of gendered trait for the Democratic party. The effects here are clear. As I expect, political engagement has a strong impact on viewing the Democratic party in feminine terms (marginal effects of 0.139 and 0.109 for likes and dislikes, respectively, both $p<0.01$), and no impact whatsoever on viewing the Democratic party in masculine terms. This suggests that respondents who are more politically engaged are more likely to have absorbed the feminized discourse about the Democratic party and more

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[20] Political engagement is based on the ANES pre-election interviewer's assessment of the respondent's level of political information (VCF0050A). Zaller reports that this assessment performs very well as a general measure of political engagement (1992, 338); this measure has the added advantage of being reasonably comparable across years, especially in contrast with fact-based measures. Party affiliation is drawn from the standard ANES party affiliation battery (VCF0301), with independents who lean toward a party classified as independents. The results are substantively unchanged when leaners are reclassified as partisans.

[21] For each like and dislike type, between one-third and one-half of respondents gave no mentions at all. This means that were I to run a model among all respondents, the coefficients would pick up the tendency to mention anything at all—essentially a model of the positivity or negativity of feelings about each party—rather than distinguishing those respondents who mention a gendered trait from those who do not, from among respondents who say something about the party.

[22] Marginal effects were calculated using the MFX command in Stata. For the dummy variables (party affiliation and gender), the marginal effect is the difference in probability between an otherwise-average respondent who has the characteristic and one who does not. For political engagement the calculation is the instantaneous marginal impact of changes in engagement on the probability for an average respondent. Because political information is coded to run from zero to one and because the predicted probability curve is quite linear across the entire range, this marginal effect is almost exactly the difference in predicted probabilities between otherwise-average respondents who are most informed and least informed.

likely, therefore, to mention feminine traits. Because the discourse around the Democratic party does not emphasize masculine traits, highly-engaged respondents are not systematically more likely than the less informed to receive masculine messages about the Democrats, and are therefore no more likely to mention masculine traits.

========== Table 3 Here ==========

The rest of table 3 indicates that the likelihood of mentioning gendered traits about the parties is utterly unaffected by a respondent's party affiliation and gender. Democrats and Republicans are equally prone to thinking about the Democratic party in gendered terms, as are men and women.[23]

Turning to images of the Republican party, table 4 presents results from the analogous probit models. Here the results for political engagement are the mirror-image of those for the Democratic party, as I expect. The most politically engaged are much more likely than the least engaged to mention masculine traits as something they like about the Republicans (marginal effect of 0.197, $p<0.01$) and somewhat more likely to mention masculine traits as something to dislike about the Republicans (marginal effect of 0.072, $p<0.01$). In contrast, and as expected, political engagement has no substantive impact on the probability of mentioning feminine characteristics as reasons to like or dislike the Republicans.

========== Table 4 Here ==========

Turning to respondent partisanship, here we see do see some small effects. Republican identifiers are somewhat more likely than others to mention masculine things they like about their own party, and somewhat less likely to mention masculine things they dislike about the party (marginal effects of 0.045 and –0.045 respectively, $p<0.01$), and Democratic identifiers are slightly less likely than independents to

[23] Models that include a more extensive set of independent variables yield entirely consistent results, both for these Democratic Party models and for the Republican Party results I present below. In particular, the probability of gendering the party is essentially equivalent for conservatives, moderates, and independents, for residents of different regions, for white and black respondents, and for older and younger respondents; in addition, there is no evidence of an interaction between engagement and either partisanship or gender. The effect of respondent education is similar to that I report for political engagement, which is consistent with prior work demonstrating the association between education and political engagement.

mention masculine things they like about the Republican party (marginal effect –0.035, $p<0.05$). Thus, there are some mild differences across partisanship groups in their tendency to associate masculine traits with the Republican party. Given the counterbalancing signs and relatively small sizes of the effects, however, these coefficients may simply be picking up the tendency Republicans to mention more things they like (and fewer they dislike) about their party, and the tendency of Democrats to mention fewer things they like about the Republican Party. In any case, this relatively limited variation does not suggest qualitative differences in gendered party images. Finally, and again as expected, there are tiny and fairly random differences between men and women, confirming that the gendering of the party images is something that both men and women pick up from the political discourse in similar ways.

Overall, then, these results confirm my expectations. Americans have absorbed the gendered discourses surrounding the parties, and stereotypically masculine and feminine traits are associated with the Republicans and Democrats, respectively. We see a nuanced pattern of variation by political engagement, which demonstrates that the gendered public messages about the parties have been taken in by Americans insofar as they pay enough attention to politics to receive those messages. Furthermore, the lack of variation among respondents, aside from their political engagement, demonstrates that the gendered aspects of the party images are absorbed homogenously by everyone, and are not being rejected by some respondents based on their other predispositions. This is consistent with the idea that these ideas about masculinity and femininity are absorbed relatively uncritically by most Americans, insofar as they are engaged with the dominant political discourse.

In sum, the results so far indicate that Americans have incorporated gendered cues into their conscious images of the traits associated with the parties. Insofar as gendered cues about the parties are absorbed without active thought, we might also expect them to structure ideas about the parties in more subtle ways as well. That is, gendered party messages may not simply connect gender-associated traits—such as toughness or compassion—with the parties, but may also forge systematic subconscious connections between Americans' concepts about the parties, contained in party schemas, and their gender schemas. We

know that gender schemas have great power to shape social cognition generally, by helping people to resolve ambiguous cues and make inferences about individuals and groups that go beyond the information at hand. Therefore, if gender and party schemas are linked cognitively, then gender stereotypes can shape political cognition in more pervasive and relatively unnoticed ways, by leading people to apply inferences drawn from gender stereotypes to the parties without necessarily recognizing the gendered nature of their cognition. To explore the possibility of these more subtle connections, in the next section I present evidence from an experiment conducted in the psychological laboratory that measured implicit cognitive connections between ideas about gender and party.

The implicit cognitive connection between party and gender

Social psychologists have explored the ways that unconscious—or implicit—concepts shape our conscious thought. Greenwald and Banaji draw a distinction between explicit and implicit cognitive processing: we are aware of our explicit thought, whereas implicit processing occurs outside of awareness (1995). Implicit cognitions can affect our conscious thoughts—they would be of little interest if they did not—but we are not aware of those effects and, therefore, have little if any conscious control over them. In the racial realm, for example, people who have their race schemas primed, or cognitively activated, are more likely to judge ambiguous actions by an African American as aggressive, compared with people whose racial schemas are unprimed (e.g., Sagar and Schofield 1980). In the gender realm, there is a long line of research on how gender stereotypes influence attributions for success and failure. In male-dominated realms, for example, people tend to attribute men's successes to ability and effort, and to attribute women's successes to luck or the ease of the task (e.g. Deaux and Emswiller 1974). Moreover, these sorts of schematic influences occur without people necessarily noticing—and therefore being able to control—the effects of their race or gender stereotypes (Greenwald and Banaji 1995).

The majority of political science research on implicit attitudes has focused on race, and has explored the ways that policy areas like welfare and crime have become associated implicitly with race for

white Americans. This work has demonstrated that appeals to these implicitly racialized policies can mobilize racial predispositions to powerfully shape citizen's attitudes and vote choices, and can do so without people being aware of the racial elements in their thinking. These effects can be quite powerful, and can be evoked by extremely subtle imagery and language—in one experiment, for example, a single reference to "inner city" criminals mobilized racial prejudice to shape crime opinions (Hurwitz and Peffley 2005); in another study a single picture of an African American candidate evoked racial consideration (Terkildsen and Schnell 1997).[24]

Over several decades American political discourse has connected the Democrats with femininity and the Republicans with masculinity in both overt and subtle ways, and we have seen that this has shaped Americans' explicit images of the parties. We might expect that associations between the political parties and gendered stereotypes might include a similarly subtle yet powerful implicit component. Such implicit connections between party and gender schemas would expand dramatically the potential for gender role attitudes to shape political cognition. Specifically, an implicit connection between party and gender schemas would mean that thinking about the parties takes place in a context inflected with ideas about masculinity and femininity; this means that people would evaluate candidates and their approaches to issues to some extent in terms of how they measure up to a person's feelings about gender.

In this section of the paper I present experimental evidence about just these sorts of implicit links between party and gender concepts. Specifically, I show that at a cognitive level, party images and gender stereotypes are not simply unrelated concepts with parallel trait content. Rather, implicit connections exist that connect the parties with our ideas about gender. In short, when Americans think about Democrats and Republicans, their ideas about femininity and masculinity are automatically and unconsciously activated.

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[24] There is considerable debate on the broader role of whites' racial attitudes in contemporary American public opinion (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; see Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000 for a recent set of entries in this debate). On implicit racial priming, see Mendelberg (2008b) and Valentino et al. (2002); also Huber & Lapinski (2006; 2008) and Mendelberg (2008a).

To show this, I examine the effects of thinking about one or the other political party on the cognitive accessibility of ideas about masculinity and femininity. It is a well-established phenomenon in social psychology that accessing a concept, even implicitly, makes it more accessible in memory and therefore faster to access subsequently. Cognitive accessibility is the mechanism underlying many priming effects, in which exposure to a political issue makes that issue more accessible in memory, and therefore more likely to come automatically to mind subsequently in thinking about related issues.[25]

Because cognitive accessibility is measured in milliseconds, we cannot assess it in the traditional survey context. However, we can measure accessibility reliably with appropriate computer software. In this study, I used a lexical decision task (LDT) to measure cognitive accessibility; this is the standard approach developed by Fazio (1990) and employed by previous studies in political science (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). In the LDT, a series of letter strings are flashed on a computer screen one at a time in a random order. Some of these strings are words and some are nonsense letter combinations, and participants are asked to distinguish "as quickly and accurately as possible" between the two by pressing one computer key for words and a different key for non-words. Of the words, five were stereotypically feminine or related to women ("feminine," "housewife," "librarian," "nurse," and "skirt") and five were masculine or related to men ("doctor," "janitor," "masculine," "razors," "trousers"); these were mixed with twelve non-gendered filler words (e.g., "actual," "tutorial," "remorse") and with 32 pronounceable nonsense strings (e.g., "catipal," "igamine," "raich").[26] The computer recorded the length of time in milliseconds that participants took to classify each target string. The logic of this procedure is that

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[25] There is lively debate on the relatively importance of (unconscious) cognitive accessibility versus (conscious) evaluation of importance in the priming of political attitudes (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997).

[26] The feminine, masculine, and filler words were matched for length and frequency of appearance in the English lexicon (Kucera and Francis 1967). The nonsense words were created by swapping letters or phonemes in real words, and were matched with the words for length. The LDT portion of the study began with a shorter set of training trails to give participants a chance to get used to the identification task.

respondents will be systematically faster to identify words that are relevant to schemas that have been recently activated, and extensive research in social psychology has demonstrated the reliability and validity of this measure of cognitive accessibility (Fazio 1990; Wittenbrink 2007). It was important that the feminine and masculine words selected for the study be gender-related, but *not* possibly associated directly with either of the parties. This ruled out most gender-related traits, and it ensures that insofar as thinking about the parties makes these gender-relevant words more accessible, that this must be due to cognitive links between party and gender schemas, and not simply because the target words are themselves part of the party schema.[27]

Therefore, insofar as implicit cognitive connections exist between the Democratic party and femininity, I expect that thinking about the party should facilitate recognition of feminine words. Similarly, an implicit connection between the Republican party and masculinity would lead thinking about the Republican party to facilitate the recognition of masculine words. The lexical decision task was embedded in a web-based survey on political attitudes and political advertising.[28] The study was completed between December 2008 and February 2009 by 195 undergraduate students at a large and diverse state university, who were recruited from three lower- and mid-level political science courses in return for extra course credit.[29] At the beginning of the survey, all participants were shown an identical pair of nonpolitical

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[27] That is, if response times to a feminine trait word like "compassionate" are reduced by thinking about the Democratic party, this could simply be due to the association of compassion with the Democrats. On the other hand, words like skirt—which have a clear link with gender but no plausible direct connection with politics—should be made accessible by thinking about the Democrats only insofar as ideas about the Democrats and about gender are linked cognitively. I did include two gendered traits—"masculine" and "feminine"—given their obvious face validity as measures of gender associations for the parties. In any case, the results presented here are substantively unaffected by the exclusion of these two items.

[28] The LDT was implemented using PxLab, an open-source software application for psychological experiments, available from http://www.uni-mannheim.de/fakul/psycho/irtel/pxlab/index.html. The web survey was implemented in PHPQuestionnaire (http://www.chumpsoft.com), which was modified by the author to implement streaming video and to interface with PxLab.

[29] As is typical with student samples, the participant pool is not representative of a national sample. The participants are relatively young (age averaged 20 and ranged from 17 to 32). About two thirds (69 percent) of participants were

television advertisements.[30] Next, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: control, Democratic or Republican. Those in the control condition immediately completed the lexical decision task. Those in the Democratic or Republican conditions were induced to think about the Democratic or Republican party, respectively, by answering the standard ANES likes and dislikes questions about the party, and then completed the lexical decision task. After the LDT, respondents completed whichever likes and dislikes they had not already answered, followed by additional political and demographic questions. Importantly, by using the likes and dislikes battery I was able to induce respondents to think about one of the parties without introducing anything specific about the party. This ensures that any implicit connections between party and gender that I find exist already for participants and are not simply the product of the experimental stimulus.

To measure the implicit associations between femininity and the Democratic party, I compare the average reaction time for feminine words between respondents in the control and Democratic conditions.[31] There is enormous individual variation in reaction times to all words, so to maximize statistical power I estimate this difference with a regression model that includes each individual's average reaction time for the neutral words as a covariate, plus a dummy variable for the experimental condition.[32] The coefficient on the condition dummy is the direct estimate of the effect on reaction time to feminine words of thinking about

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women; 54 percent identified as Democrats, 26 percent as Republicans and 19 percent as independent. There were no substantively or statistically significant demographic differences across conditions, and there is no evidence that gender, party identification, or political knowledge moderate any of the findings reported below.

[30] The ads were for the Chevy Malibu and for the Apple iPod. There was also a fourth condition, which included a pair of political advertisements in place of the product commercials. Participants in this fourth condition were omitted from the present analysis.

[31] Because reaction time data are notoriously noisy, following standard practice I exclude trials with extreme outlier response times in calculating the averages, as well as trials in which a respondent misidentified a target word as a non-word.

[32] Thus, I regress individual-level average reaction time to feminine words on individual-level average reaction time to neutral words and a dummy variable for the Democratic condition. Because the estimated coefficients for neutral-word reaction times are very close to one, the approach I take is almost identical to simply subtracting each respondent's neutral-word average from that respondent's feminine-word average. Employing this alternate approach generates estimates of the size of the priming effect that are within a few milliseconds of the estimates I present below.

the Democratic party, and is therefore my indicator of an implicit cognitive connection between the party and femininity. To estimate the implicit association between masculinity and the Republican party I conduct an analogous analysis of masculine-word reaction times between the control and Republican party conditions. Finally, in order to put the estimated effects in context, I scale the results to reflect the neutral-word reaction times of an average respondent. Figure 2 presents the results of this procedure; the underlying regression models are presented in the appendix.

========== Figure 2 Here ==========

There is clear evidence for an implicit cognitive connection between the Democratic party and femininity. As depicted in the left panel of figure 2, average response time to the feminine words was reduced by 51 milliseconds ($t=2.27$, one-sided $p=0.012$). For the Republican party and masculinity, the results are also consistent with expectations, although the effect is smaller. Thinking about the Republican party reduces average reaction times for masculine words by about 20 milliseconds ($t=1.69$, one-sided $p=0.046$). These findings suggest that simply by bringing the Democratic party to mind by asking participants what they like and dislike about the party, an implicit link with their ideas about gender and femininity are automatically and unconsciously activated. Conversely, thinking about the Republican Party automatically activates ideas about masculinity.

The estimate of the strength of the Democratic-feminine association is quite a bit larger than the estimated Republican-masculine connection; however, the difference between the two estimates does not achieve statistical significance (two-sided $p \approx 0.20$). I hesitate, therefore, to go too far in interpreting this difference. Nevertheless, insofar as these estimates reflect a real difference in the underlying cognitive connections, we might understand this difference in two related ways. First, the political discourse over the past several decades may simply have been more effective in linking the Democratic Party with femininity than in connecting the Republicans with masculinity. Second, messages in the political environment that evoke femininity may be more psychologically salient than masculine messages, because they stand out more in a political realm that as a whole is symbolically—and often literally—male. This masculine baseline could

make the gendered aspect of references to femininity implicitly stand out, while many references to masculinity might feel simply "political" and not so much about gender. Such a pattern would be consistent with work in social psychology showing that non-prototypical members of a category are generally more salient than prototypical members.[33]

Despite these possible partisan differences, the broader implication of these results is that as soon as people think about the political parties, their ideas about gender are activated. This activation encompasses not simply politically-relevant attributes such as compassion or aggression, but also includes the entire rich contents of gender schemas. Gender schemas could then help citizens make sense of ambiguous political phenomena, and in so doing shape their understanding and evaluation of those phenomena. As the meaning of most political actions are to some extent ambiguous, this opens a wide door for gendered political cognition. For example, is a new economic proposal prudently cautious, hopelessly timid, or recklessly aggressive? Or does the use of cruise missiles to strike at distant, hidden enemies represent a cowardly unwillingness to confront our foes, or a sensible decision not to risk needless danger? If citizens' gender schemas are activated by the simple act of thinking about the parties, their answers to those questions will be shaped in part by their feelings about masculinity and femininity. In addition, leaders from each party who take the identical action might nevertheless be judged rather differently given the different implicit gendered assumptions that citizens associate with their parties. More broadly, the gendered context of the parties will make implicit attitudes about masculinity and femininity weight more heavily in broader political judgments, compared with other grounds for evaluating leaders and their policies.

In this context, then, Arnold Schwarzenegger's references to Democrats as "girly-men"—along with more subtle evocations of that basic point—carry a particularly strong political punch because they evoke not

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[33] Miller and colleagues find, for example, that people tend to explain gender differences between voters and professors—both prototypically masculine—in terms of characteristics of women, while explaining gender differences between elementary school teachers in terms of characteristics of men (1991).

simply the feminine traits consciously associated with the Democrats, but also much wider range of negative characteristics our culture associates with effeminate men. The implicit connections between party and gender schemas mean that *any* thought about the parties will draw to some extent on stereotypes about masculinity and femininity. In society that continues to associate leadership with masculinity, this can have far-reaching effects on how leaders from each party are perceived by the public.

Conclusion

Taken together, my findings demonstrate that ideas about the two political parties are mapped onto ideas about the two genders, both in the images citizens consciously hold of the parties and in the implicit connections between their mental conceptions of the parties and of gender.[34] These findings have important implications for the growing literature on the interactions between party stereotypes and gender stereotypes in shaping citizens' impressions of candidates. A large body of experimental laboratory research demonstrates that gender stereotypes shape citizens' perceptions of candidates' traits and issues positions, especially for female candidates and especially in the absence of partisan cues. However, more recent work that explores the interaction between party and gender stereotypes suggests that partisan and gender cues interrelate in complex ways (Dolan 2004; Huddy and Capelos 2002; Koch 2002). This seems especially true for female Republican candidates, whose party and gender cues in some sense conflict (McDermott 1997); in other contexts, party seems to overwhelm gender cues (Hayes 2009).

These findings suggests that we should not think of party and gender stereotypes as independent alternatives that might affect political cognition, but rather as two sets of stereotypes with important

[34] This mapping of one binary distinction onto another raises the question of how third parties are understood. Baker notes that during the height of the nineteenth century party era, men who were not committed to either party were seen as "political impotent" and referred to as the "third sex" of American politics (1984, 628), and Hoganson cites references from this era to members of third parties as "'eunuchs,' 'man-milliners,' members of a 'third sex,' 'political hermaphrodites,' and 'the neuter gender not popular either in nature or society'" (1998, 23). On a related note, see Fausto-Sterling (Fausto-Sterling 1993) for an argument that sex is itself not as simple a binary distinction as we often assume.

intersectional linkages. Work on the intersectionality of race and gender has explored the ways that race and gender categories each derive their cultural meanings in part from their relationship with each other (on intersectionality in political science research, see Hancock 2007). Similarly, we need to take careful account of the ways that party and gender stereotypes shape each other when we explore people's reactions to the parties and their candidates. This also suggests a need to explore the interactions between party and gender stereotypes in ways that take account not just of variation in candidate party affiliation and candidate sex, but also variation in candidate gender; that is, variation in the ways that male and female candidates embody masculinity and femininity.

The research on candidate gender suggests that voters' gender stereotypes frequently disadvantage female candidates in important ways, because they are judged to be worse decision makers and weaker leaders, as well as less competent on and less interested in issues of foreign policy and the economy. However, female candidates are also viewed as more honest and more compassionate, and are believed to be more interested in and trustworthy on "compassion" issues such as health care, education and those that affect women and children. This means that the public issue agenda matters; in 1992, for example, the Hill-Thomas hearings and other factors led voters to favor outsiders, and women in particular (Delli Carpini and Fuchs 1993; Duerst-Lahti and Verstegen 1995; Sapiro and Conover 1997; Dolan 1998; Kim 1998). More broadly, this means that candidates may make strategic choices about their self-presentation, and the net effects of gender stereotypes may advantage female candidates, at least in some electoral contexts (Kahn 1993; Iyengar et al. 1997).

This body of research has some implications for how to think about the net electoral effects of the gendering of the political parties. Different issue agendas and different constructions of the problems we face should affect the degree to which citizens feel a need—conscious or subconscious—for symbolically masculine leaders. The masculine image of fatherly protection may be more appealing in times of external threat and in times when people feel insecure about changing gender relations within society. Kristin

Hoganson argues, for example, that shifting gender relations in the family, the workplace, and in politics conspired to make a form of potent, aggressive masculinity particularly politically salient at the turn of the twentieth century and contributed to American involvement in the Spanish-American war. After the subsequent Philippines war turned into a bloody, cruel quagmire, however, this aggressive masculinity came to seem reckless and dangerous, increasing the appeal of those who promised an end to the war and a more peaceful approach (1998). The obvious parallels with modern development in Afghanistan and Iraq present a fruitful area for additional research on the ways that masculinity and femininity play out politically against different policy backgrounds.

In conclusion, it seems likely that on balance the masculinization of the Republican party and feminization of the Democratic party has conferred a net electoral advantage on Republicans. However, cultural ideas about masculinity and femininity, and about their connections with politics are complex enough that Democratic candidates may have more latitude than simply to try to out-man the Republican party. While analysts have commented on Barack Obama's relatively feminine appearance and approach, he does not seem to have suffered from this image in the ways that his recent Democratic predecessors. Of course many factors shaped Obama's image and his ultimate success, including of course his unique status as the first African American major-party nominee and the deep public anger over the Iraq war and other failings of the Bush presidency. This context, however, may have allowed Obama to project an image not of effeminacy, nor of aggressive masculinity, but rather of moral and controlled manliness; an image that may also have helped him counter stereotypes of black violence (Cooper 2008). This sort of reshaping of the terms of the connection of masculinity and politics may have helped the Democrats win the White House in 2008; it leaves unanswered, of course, the broader question of how political leadership might be decoupled from masculinity in whatever form. Even with this sort of flexibility in the definition of political masculinity, as long as our ideas about our political parties and politics in general are mapped onto notions of gender, women and men who do not reflect hegemonic ideas of masculinity will face difficult, if not insurmountable, hurdles in convincing many citizens of their suitableness for leadership.

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Tables & Figures

Table 1: Masculine party trait impressions, 1972-2004

	Percentage of mentions that are masculine	
	Likes	*Dislikes*
Democratic Party	2.2	2.9
Republican Party	10.7	4.4
Ratio (Republican / Democratic)	4.9	1.5

Source: National Election Studies, presidential years from 1972–2004. Based on 55,127 total mentions (12,238 Republican likes, 14,703 Republican dislikes, 15,896 Democratic likes, and 12,290 Democratic dislikes). Differences between the parties are statistically significant, $p < 0.001$.

Table 2: Feminine party trait impressions, 1972-2004

	Percentage of mentions that are feminine	
	Likes	*Dislikes*
Democratic Party	4.1	4.4
Republican Party	0.6	1.0
Ratio (Democratic / Republican)	6.9	4.5

Source: National Election Studies, presidential years from 1972–2004. Based on 55,127 total mentions (12,238 Republican likes, 14,703 Republican dislikes, 15,896 Democratic likes, and 12,290 Democratic dislikes). Differences between the parties are statistically significant, $p < 0.001$.

Table 3: Determinants of holding a gendered image of the Democratic party, among respondents who mention any likes or dislikes, 1984–2004

	Mentioned masculine		*Mentioned feminine*	
	like	*dislike*	*like*	*dislike*
Political engagement	–0.004	–0.011	0.139**	0.109**
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Democrat	0.001	0.000	0.003	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Republican	–0.007	–0.014*	0.002	–0.001
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Female	–0.002	0.003	0.018*	–0.007
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
N	5,262	4,335	5,262	4,335
chi2	7.74	33.84	72.28	67.93

Cell entries are marginal effects of each independent variable on the probability of mentioning a gendered trait, based on probit models; standard errors of marginal effects appear in parentheses. Models also include year dummies. Source: American National Election Studies.
** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$; ^ $p<0.10$ two tailed

Table 4: Determinants of holding a gendered image of the Republican party, among respondents who mention any likes or dislikes, 1984–2004

	Mentioned masculine		*Mentioned feminine*	
	like	*dislike*	*like*	*dislike*
Political engagement	0.197**	0.072**	–0.011	0.019*
	(0.027)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Democrat	–0.036*	0.008	–0.003	–0.011*
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Republican	0.044**	–0.046**	0.006	0.016*
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Female	–0.008	–0.017*	0.003	–0.003
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	4,316	4,972	4,316	4,972
chi2	112.73	70.77	13.28	56.16

Cell entries are marginal effects of each independent variable on the probability of mentioning a gendered trait, based on probit models; standard errors of marginal effects appear in parentheses. Models also include year dummies. Source: American National Election Studies.
** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$; ^ $p<0.10$ two tailed

Figure 1: Gendered party mentions by year



Figure 2: Implicit Party-Gender Connections



Figures show mean predicted reaction times by condition, for a respondent with typical neutral–word reaction times, from regression models that include respondents' mean neutral–word reaction time as a covariate, as described in the text. Regression models appear in the appendix.

Appendix Tables

Table A1: Masculine (+) traits

Code	Description
121	Can trust them; they keep their promises; you know where they stand
213	Dependable/Trustworthy/Reliable; a man you can trust with the responsibilities of government ("trust" in the capability sense, rather than the honesty sense)
215	A military man; a good military/war record; served in Viet Nam: decorated veteran
218	Has government experience/political experience/seniority/ incumbency (also see code 0722)
220	A statesman; has experience in foreign affairs
301	Dignified/has dignity
303	Strong/decisive/self-confident/aggressive; will end all this indecision; 'sticks to his guns' [2004]
305	Inspiring; a man you can follow; "a leader"; charisma
313	A politician/political person; (too) much in politics; a good politician; part of Washington crowd; politically motivated; just wants to be re-elected
315	Independent; no one runs him; his own boss
403	Man of high principles/ideals; high moral purpose; idealistic (if too idealistic, code 0416) ; morality
411	Patriotic; (88) like Bush's stand on Pledge of Allegiance issue; (Pro) Kerry statements/actions about the Viet Nam War. (The R says that Kerry was right, showed bravery, in statements/actions after he came home from the war.)
415	Realistic
425	Self-made; not well off; started out as poor; worked his way up; (started out) unpolished/unrefined/rough
432	Safe/Stable
503	Not controlled by party regulars/bosses
601	Good/Efficient/Businesslike administration; balanced budget; lower/wouldn't increase national debt; cautious spending
617	Will face (difficult) issues; faces problems directly; faces up to political reality
707	Speaks of party/candidate as good protector(s); will know what to do; more intelligent
835	Has a well-defined set of beliefs/definite philosophy; does not compromise on principles; has (clear) understanding of goals they stand for
837	Favor work ethic; believes in self-reliance/in people working hard to get ahead
841	Keep track of/control over administration heads, cabinet members, etc.; follow through on policies; determine if programs are working

Table A2: Masculine (–) traits

Code	Description
172	Doesn't listen to/understand the needs and wants of the people/the majority of the people
191	Doesn't recognize need to reform some of its stands/initiatives that haven't worked/won't work
312	Doesn't know how to handle people (at personal level)
318	Not humble enough; too cocky/self-confident
328	Doesn't listen to the people/does not solicit public opinion; isn't accessible to constituents (NFS)
431	Unsafe/Unstable; dictatorial; craves power; ruthless
436	Cold/Aloof
438	Not likeable; can't get along with people
465	Taking undeserved credit; taking credit for actionc ,events, or policies one is not responsible for; Gore claiming "to have invented the internet"
604	Dishonest/Corrupt government; "mess in Washington"; immorality in government; reference to Hayes, Mills, Lance
719	Sexual scandals; reference to Chappaquidic; Kennedy's personal problems; damaging incidents in personal life–sexual escapades
808	Not humanistic; favor property rights over human beings
830	Anti-equality; believe some people should have more than others/people should not be treated equally
832	Selfish, only help themselves
846	Will not involve people/Congress/Cabinet/advisors/other government officials in government/decision making

Table A3: Feminine (+) traits

Code	Description
311	Knows how to handle people (at personal level)
327	Listens to the people/solicits public opinion; any mention of polls or questionnaires; is accessible to constituents (NFS)
435	Kind/Warm/Gentle; caring
437	Likeable; gets along with people; friendly; outgoing; nice
807	Humanistic; favor human beings over property rights
829	For equality; believe everyone should have things equally/ be treated equally
831	Generous, compassionate, believe in helping others
845	Will involve/wants to involve people/Congress/Cabinet/ advisors/other government officials in government/ decision making

Table A4: Feminine (–) traits

Code	Description
214	Undependable/Untrustworthy/Unreliable; a man you can't trust with the responsibilities of government
216	Not a military man; bad military/war record; no military/war record (but see 0719); dodged the draft; joined the National Guard; questions his service in Viet Nam
219	Lacks government experience/political experience
221	Not a statesman; lacks experience in foreign affairs
304	Weak/indecisive/lacks self-confidence/vacillating; "waffles"; "wishy-washy"
306	Uninspiring; not a man you can follow; not a leader; lacks charisma
316	Not independent; run by others; not his own man/boss
404	Lacks principles/ideals
412	Unpatriotic; (88) dislike Dukakis' stand on Pledge of Allegiance issue; (Anti) Kerry statements/actions about VietNam after he came back from war. (The R says Kerry was wrong, defamed America, was unpatriotic after he came home from the war.)
416	Unrealistic; too idealistic; (if "idealistic" in positive sense, code 0403)
418	Not sensible; impractical
502	Controlled by party regulars/bosses/machine
541	Reference to the Eagleton affair–1972; reference to physical or mental health of vice-presidential incumbent/ candidate; emotional stability/state of V-P incumbent/ candidate
618	Will not face (difficult) issues; will not face problems directly; ignores political reality
708	Speaks of party/candidate as bad protector(s); won't know what to do
836	Has poorly defined set of beliefs; lacks a definite philosophy; compromise on principles; has no (clear) understanding of goals they stand for
838	Doesn't favor work ethic; believes in people being handed things/in government handouts (if specific policy mentioned, code in 0900's) ; doesn't believe in teaching people to be independent
842	Don't (as in 0841)

Table A5: Impact of thinking Democrats on feminine-word reaction times

	Reaction time to feminine words
Average neutral-word reaction time	0.94**
	(0.08)
Democratic condition	–51.05*
	(22.47)
Intercept	57.08
	(55.68)
N	125
Std error of regression	124.73
R-squared	0.52

Model run among participants in the control and Democratic conditions.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed

Table A6: Impact of thinking about Republicans on masculine-word reaction times

	Reaction time to masculine words
Average neutral-word reaction time	0.81**
	(0.06)
Republican condition	–20.48^
	(12.09)
Intercept	141.75**
	(38.78)
N	134
Std error of regression	69.85
R-squared	0.60

Model run among participants in the control and Republican conditions.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed