Manly Republicans and Effeminate Democrats: Exploring the Implicit Connections between Gender and the Modern American Political Parties[1]

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Over the past 40 years American society has experienced huge and controversial shifts in women's rights and in men's and women's roles. Over this period the two major political parties have presented substantially different gender images to the public: they have polarized on women's rights and abortion, female candidates have become both more common and more likely to be Democrats, a gender gap has become a regular feature of electoral politics, and Republican presidential candidates from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush have had considerable success framing themselves as the stronger, more manly candidate. This paper makes use of an innovative measure of implicit associations—the Implicit Associations Test—to explore the implicit and explicit associations between the political parties and gender in the contemporary United States. Party is, of course, a centrally-important frame of reference that people use to make sense of politics; my findings suggest that even when gender is not explicitly in play, citizens' ideas about masculinity and femininity may nevertheless shape political evaluations more broadly than we might otherwise expect.

While the elite side of these developments has received considerable scholarly attention, we know relatively little about how individual citizens have reacted to these shifts in the parties' public images. A partial exception is work that asks whether gender issues have precipitated a partisan realignment. Several scholars have shown that since 1980 the parties have polarized at the elite level on abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and other issues of women's equality and roles (Wolbrecht 2000; Freeman 1987; Costain 1991), and Greg Adams demonstrates that this elite polarization on abortion, coupled with clear signals from the parties on the issue, has spawned mass-level partisan realignment (1997). However, beyond abortion, neither party has placed great public emphasis on gender issues, particularly those surrounding changes to gender *roles*, rather than formal equality for women (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Coupled with mass-level ambivalence about gender-role change, this lack of clarity has prevented a more comprehensive gender-based realignment, leading Sanbonmatsu to conclude that abortion is the exception and that "dramatic changes that have occurred in gender roles have not been absorbed into the party system" (2002, 220).

None of this work directly addresses the public's broader party images; nor does it explore ways that ideas about gender not captured by issue positions might shape those images without necessarily inducing people to switch parties.[2] Most work on gender and political behavior has instead focused on the gender gap in partisan identification, vote, and public opinion; or on differences in how people react to male and female candidates.[3] These literatures demonstrate that gender stereotypes can shape issue opinion and candidate evaluation in subtle ways. An important recent line of work on female candidates explores the interactions between citizens' gender and party stereotypes; often party stereotypes override gender stereotypes, although in some cases the two interact in more complex ways (Dolan 2004; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Koch 2002; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009; Huddy and Capelos 2002; Matland and King 2002; Hayes 2009).

The gendered facets of citizen's party images hold the potential to shape political cognition in important ways for two reasons. First, people are quite adept at applying gender stereotypes, and in particular the attributes "masculine" and "feminine," to a wide range of objects that are not literally male or female. Even young children reliably classify colors, types of plants and animals, shapes, and much more as masculine or feminine, leading Bem to conclude that "there appears to be no other dichotomy in human experience with as many entities assimilated to it as the distinction between male and female" (1981, 354; see also Leinbach, Hort, and Fagot 1997).[4] We might expect, therefore, that citizens will be likely to draw on partisan-based gender associations to make inferences about political candidates, issues, and groups.

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[2] Some scholars have explored citizen's party images, using the ANES open-ended likes and dislikes questions, but none has focused on gender (Sanders 1988; Baumer and Gold 1995; Trilling 1976); related work on the contents of partisan stereotypes has similarly not focused on gender (e.g. Rahn 1993; Bastedo and Milton Lodge 1980; Hamill, Milton Lodge, and Blake 1985). More recently, Danny Hayes has explored the traits that citizens associate with the parties' presidential nominees, but without an explicit focus on the gendered nature of those trait attributions (2005).

[3] For overviews of the gender gap literature, see Huddy et al. (2008) and Sapiro (2003, 605-10). For an overview of the literature on female candidates, see Dolan (2008).

[4] Interestingly, this process appears to be only partly voluntary; speakers of languages that gender nouns tend to associate a wide range of gendered characteristics with objects depending on the gender their language assigns to the noun (Phillips and Boroditsky 2003).

Second, precisely because gender-related issues have not been fully assimilated to the existing partisan alignment, these gendered trait associations may be particularly likely to create or reinforce cross-pressures for a significant number of citizens.

Masculinity and femininity in American culture and politics

Modern American ideas about masculinity and femininity are "fuzzy sets" (Deaux 1987) made up of clusters of attributes that define the characteristics thought to be characteristic of men and women, respectively. At their core are a set of instrumental personality traits for men and expressive personality traits for women. Thus, masculine men are thought to be active, independent, and decisive; feminine women are thought to be compassionate, devoted to others, emotional, and kind. These core traits are linked with a range of other features, including other traits (masculine men are aggressive, practical, tough, hardworking, and hierarchical; feminine women are gentle, submissive, soft, ladylike, and egalitarian); physical characteristics (masculine men are big, strong, and muscular; feminine women are small, weak, and soft spoken); social roles and occupations; interests; and sexuality (masculine men and feminine women are both expected to be attracted to the other sex).[5] Moreover, the cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity treat each as a coherent package that is defined in opposition to the other: "feminine" is thus understood as "not masculine" and vice-versa (Foushee, Helmreich, and Spence 1979).[6]

It should be noted that this configuration works to associate masculinity with politics and leadership. The very idea of a political or public realm is constructed in contrast with the private, and the

[5] See, for example, Spence and colleagues (Spence, Helmreich, and Holahan 1979; Spence, Helmreich, and Helmreich 1978; Spence and Buckner 1995), Bem (1974; 1981; 1987), and Maccoby (1987). For a review of the vast literature on the conceptualization, measurement, and contents of ideas about masculinity and femininity, see Lippa (2005, chapter 2). There is considerable cross-cultural consistency in gender stereotypes, amid important cultural variation, though this consistency—and debates about its social or biological bases—is tangential to the purposes of this paper (see, e.g., Ortner 1974; Ortner 1996, chapter 7).

[6] There is an extensive literature in social psychology showing that masculine and feminine traits and other characteristics do not, in fact, form a single bipolar dimension at the individual level (Constantinople 2005); rather, both are multidimensional constructs that vary independently (Bem 1974; Spence, Helmreich, and Helmreich 1978). Nevertheless, people generally *believe* that they form coherent and oppositional packages (Deaux 1987).

public/private duality is deeply gendered, with the public sphere traditionally associated explicitly with men (e.g. Phillips 1991).[7] While formal gender segregation is now gone, both the political realm and leadership—in and out of politics—continue to have symbolically masculine connotations (Ridgeway 2001). Interestingly, Carlson and Boring present experimental evidence that male and female candidates are rated as more masculine and less feminine when described as winning, rather than losing (1981).

Finally, it should be noted that stereotypes of masculinity and femininity also include negative attributes. Thus, for example, stereotypes of men include characteristics such as greedy, hostile, and self-interested, and stereotypes of women include negative traits like spineless and gullible. In addition, some aspects of masculinity, such as aggressiveness and violence, can take on negative connotations when they appear to be excessive or when applied to an undeserving target (Spence, Helmreich, and Holahan 1979; Spence, Helmreich, and Helmreich 1978).

Republicans and Democrats become masculine and feminine

There are five interrelated developments in the late 1970s and early 1980s that we might expect to have mapped masculinity and femininity—already important for politics—onto the Republican and Democratic Parties, respectively. I discuss these developments here to motivate the analyses that follow; it is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to demonstrate the causal impact that they might have on those analyses. First, as I discuss above, Wolbrecht documents the polarization of party elites over the Equal Rights Amendment and other issues of women's equality in the late 1970s, and Adams traces the polarization of the parties on abortion over the same period. Earlier, the Republican Party was modestly *more* supportive of women's rights than the Democrats, though neither party devoted much attention to the issue. By 1980, the parties had staked out the positions they hold today, and differences over abortion in

[7] Helen Haste argues that the idea of gender difference serves as a sort of master metaphor that gives meaning to myriad dualities at the center of Western culture, including public-private, rational-intuitive, active-passive, hard-soft, thinking-feeling, and many more (1993). On the role of gender ideals in the politics of the American founding and early republic, see Kann (1998); Kerber (1986); Kang (2009); and Bloch (1987).

particular had become an important feature of the elite-level party alignment. This polarization is reflected in stark differences in party platforms, in bill sponsorship rates, and in roll-call votes, leading Wolbrecht to suggest that "the lines have thus been drawn with considerable clarity since 1980" (2000, 6; Adams 1997). These partisan differences were reinforced and made more salient by the growing role within the Republican coalition of antifeminist groups and the social conservative movement and by the alliance of feminist groups with the Democratic Party (Freeman 1975; Freeman 1993; Spruill 2008).

These developments have been reinforced by the gender associations of the issues "owned" by each of the political parties. There is considerable overlap between the political issues that citizens associate with each party, on the one hand, and that they associate with men and women, on the other. Republicans are thought to handle better such issues as defense, dealing with terrorism, and controlling crime and drugs (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003); these are precisely the sorts of issues that Americans associate with men or with masculine traits (Kahn 1996; Alexander and Andersen 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Conversely, Democratic-owned issues include education, health care, helping the poor, protecting the environment, and promoting peace; these are all also associated with women or with feminine traits.[8] Rapoport and colleagues (1989) find that people make trait inferences about candidates based on their issue positions; we might therefore expect similar inferences about party traits based on the issues associated with each.

Third, these parallel party and gender issue competencies are reflected in and reinforced by public attention to the gender gap in vote and partisanship (Gilens 1988; for an overview of the enormous gender gap literature, see Sapiro 2003). The gender gap first achieved sustained public attention after the 1980 election as a result of efforts by women's groups to increase their influence within the Democratic Party (Mansbridge 1985; Mueller 1988), and has been a fixture of media coverage of presidential campaigns ever

[8] Huddy and Terkildsen present evidence that the gender associations of issues are not simply the product of the idea that women are more liberal than men; rather, the gender associations flow importantly from stereotyped beliefs about women's traits and abilities.

since. While the size and consistency of the gender gap is often overstated in the popular media (Ladd 1997), coverage of the gap likely serves to reinforce for the public the association of the Republican Party with men and the Democratic Party with women.

Fourth, the association of women with the Democratic Party is further reinforced by the fact that substantially more women have been elected as Democrats than as Republicans over the past several decades. The Democratic nomination of Geraldine Ferraro for Vice President in 1984 was intended as a signal that the Democrats were the party of women (e.g. Wolbrecht 2000, 52-3). While Mondale and Ferraro did not win, the number of Democratic women elected at the federal and state levels has increased faster than the number of Republican women, generating what Laurel Elder has called a "partisan gap" among female elected officials (2008). As depicted in figure 1, since the mid-1980s the number of Democratic women elected to the US Senate, the US House, and to state legislatures has increased steadily, while the number of Republican women has increased much more slowly if at all. This means that citizens are likely to observe more women in politics who are Democrats than Republicans.

==== Figure 1 Here ====[9]

Finally, as I discuss above, the concept of leadership and the political realm itself both carry symbolically male connotations. Perhaps because of this, since the early republic presidential candidates and their campaigns have often emphasized their own masculine credentials and tried to undermine those of their opponents (Kann 1998; Etcheson 1995; Duerst-Lahti 2008; Duerst-Lahti 2006; Bederman 1995; Hoganson 1998; Fahey 2007; Ducat 2004). More anecdotally, journalistic and academic observers alike have suggested that from Ronald Reagan in 1980 through George W. Bush in 2004, the Republicans have frequently won the battle to appear more manly, through a combination of claims about personal character and assertions that they are strong—and their opponents weak—on issues ranging from standing up to

[9] Senate and House figures are from CAWP (2010). State legislature data provided by Laurel Elder, based on Elder (2008).

foreign enemies to being tough on crime and drugs (e.g., Orman 1987; Mihalec 1984; Jeffords 1994; Kimmel 1987; Ducat 2004; Malin 2005; Fahey 2007; Rich 2004). These gendered differences in candidate presentation and substance dovetail with linguist George Lakoff's argument that conservatives and liberals—and by extension the Republican and Democratic parties—operate in different, and metaphorically gendered, moral universes. In Lakoff's account, different approaches to the appropriate role of the government metaphorically evoke different views on parenting: the Republicans are the party of the strict father, while the Democrats are the party of the nurturing mother (Lakoff 2002).

In sum, these interrelated developments all conspire to associate the Republican Party with men and masculinity and the Democratic Party with women and femininity. These gendered associations have their foundation in political issues that deal explicitly with questions of gender, and are reinforced through recent political campaigns and other public discourse surrounding the parties. In the sections that follow I explore empirically the implicit and explicit associations Americans have between the parties and gender concepts.

Measurement of implicit associations with the Implicit Associations Test

The Implicit Associations Test (IAT) is a method of measuring the implicit, or unconscious, associations between mental concepts. It is designed to measure those unconscious associations directly, thereby bypassing the limits of introspection—we may not be aware of associations that exist—and bypassing respondent's inclination not to report some attitudes, even though they may be aware of them. The IAT asks respondents to sort stimulus items that represent two different pairs of categories. Thus, for example, in this study respondents sorted stimulus items for the categories "Democratic Party" and "Republican Party," on the one hand, and for "Female" and "Male" on the other hand. These four categories are sorted using only two response options—left and right. The sorting takes place on a computer, which measures the time in milliseconds that it takes a respondent to sort each item as it is presented on the screen, by pressing a key with their left or right hand. After a series of training trials, the central part of the IAT measurement

involves a comparison between two sorting tasks. In the first central task, the concepts "Male" and "Republican" are associated with one response option (say, left) while "Female" and "Democrat" are associated with the other response option (right). In the second central task the responses are re-paired, so that, for example, "Male" and "Democrat" are both associated with the left response, and "Female" and "Republican" are both associated with the right response.

The logic behind the IAT is that this sorting task will be easier—and therefore faster—when associated concepts share a response key, compared to the task when they are flipped. The IAT measure of the association, then, is based on the difference in average response time between the task where related concepts are paired and the task where they are flipped. Thus, the IAT does not measure directly the strength of any one association (between, for example, "Republican" and "Male"); rather, it measures the difference in the strength of two pairs of associations (that is, the difference between "Republican-Male" and "Democrat-Female" on the one hand and "Republican-Female" and "Democrat-Male" on the other).

For the party-gender IAT, my expectation is that the former links will be stronger than the latter, and that respondents will therefore be faster to sort items related to the parties and to the genders when Republican and male items share one response option and Democratic and female items share the other. Figure 2 displays this hypothesis: the red connections (paths A and D) represent implicit connections that I expect to be relatively strong, the blue dashed connections (paths B and C) represent implicit connections that I expect to be relatively weak.

For the current study, the political parties were each represented by a set of three stylized pictures, and the genders were each represented by a set of seven gendered pronouns; these appear in tables 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 3 presents an example of the computer screen during a single IAT trial. In this task, the respondent presses the left-hand key ("e") for items indicating "Male" and for items indicating "Democrats" and the right-hand key ("i") for items indicating "Female" or "Republicans." For this trial, therefore, the respondent would press the "e" key. The central measurement tasks are embedded in a series of practice tasks; the order of tasks is listed in table 3. As that table indicates, the left-right associations of "Male" and

"Female" in the first task are randomized across respondents, as are the order of the two measurement tasks, which are tasks 3 and 5.

The raw response times are scored by an algorithm (D) that eliminates trials with extremely long latencies (more than 10,000 ms) and normalizes scores based on each respondent's response-time standard deviation. In addition, respondents with high error rates or a high percentage of trials with extremely fast (< 300ms) responses are eliminated from the analysis. For details on the scoring procedures, see Greenwald et al. (2003). IAT data collected and scored in this way have proven internal validity and reliability (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007).

Implicit associations between gender and party

Study methods

The current study collected data from respondents using an innovative web-based platform called Project Implicit (http://implicit.harvard.edu). The "demonstration" portion of the site allows people to take any of a range of IATs for their personal edification and reflection; the "research" side of the site allows respondents to register to participate in a range of randomly-assigned research studies such as the current one. Since 2000, Project Implicit has collected IAT data from over 5,000,000 sessions (Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji 2007).

While the participants on Project Implicit studies are not a representative sample of any population, they are substantially more diverse than the college-student samples typically available for these sorts of computer-aided measurement strategies. For the current study, for example, respondents ranged from age 12 to 87, with a mean of 31 and a standard deviation of 13; the inter-quartile range runs from 21 to 39.[10] The sample also has reasonable variation by gender (about two-thirds (64 percent) of respondents were female), by political party identification (22 percent Republican, 39 percent Democrat, and 39 percent

[10] The results are unaffected when those under age 18 are eliminated from the sample.

independent), and by educational attainment (47 percent of respondents have a college degree or higher). The study was completed by 1,090 respondents between December 2009 and January 2010; of these, 731 completed the IAT portion of the study with valid data; the analysis focuses on these respondents.[11]

Implicit party-gender associations

Among the 731 respondents with valid IAT data, the average implicit party-gender association is +0.106, indicating a mild-to-moderate association of the Republican Party with males and the Democratic Party with females. However, the average implicit association is affected substantially by respondents' own gender and party identification. Figure 4 shows that the mean implicit party-gender association varies substantially across party ID and gender categories. We observe the strongest implicit association in the expected direction among Republican men and Democratic women; the association is weaker among independents and is actually reversed among Republican women and Democratic men.

We can understand this pattern of implicit associations in terms of the unified theory proposed by Greenwald et al. (2002), which extends cognitive consistency and balance theories to explain the relationship among implicit associations that involve a person's self-concept. They present evidence that when implicit associations exist between one concept—such as one's self—and two other concepts—such as gender and partisanship—that a third implicit association will form between those other two concepts. Thus, we would expect that a hypothetical male Democrat, would have implicit associations between his self-concept and both "Democrat" and "Male." According to Greenwald and colleagues' unified theory, and as depicted in figure 5, this male Democrat should form an additional implicit association between "Democrat" and "Male" to complete the triangle. This Democrat-Male association would be layered on top of the culturally-transmitted Democrat-Female and Republican-Male associations. As I discuss above, IAT measures the difference between two pairs of associations: between, that is, it compares the average strength

[11] 738 respondents completed the IAT portion of the study, of which 7 were eliminated for having too many errors in classification, too many extremely fast trails, or both.

of Democrat-Female and Republican-Male on the one hand with the average strength of Democrat-Male and Republican-Female on the other. So for a male Democrat, the IAT is measuring a combination of the strength of the hypothesized culturally-induced party-gender association (which should associate Democrat with Female and Republicans with Male) *plus* the self-concept induced association between Democrat and Male. These two will work against each other in the IAT; depending on the relative strength of the cultural and self-concept-related associations, this will lead Democratic men to exhibit lower implicit party-gender associations in the hypothesized direction, or—as we see in figure 4—associations in the other direction. These different associations are depicted schematically in figure 6 for a hypothetical male Democrat and a hypothetical female Democrat. The hypothesized culturally-induced associations are in read, and the expected self-concept induced associations are depicted as black dashed lines. For the male Democrat, then, the IAT will *underestimate* the size of the culturally-induced association; for the female Democrat, on the other hand, the self-concept induced association between Female and Democrat will add to the culturally-induced association, and the IAT will *overestimate* the culturally-induced association.

One way to disentangle the culturally- and self-concept induced implicit associations is to purge the IAT estimated associations of the self-concept component by regressing the individual-level IAT D score on respondent partisanship, respondent gender, and their interaction (see Greenwald et al. 2002for a detailed description of this procedure). Table 4 presents the results of this analysis. In these models, respondent gender is coded 1 for men and –1 for women, and party identification is entered as a pair of dummy variables for Democratic and Republican identification, with independents as the omitted reference category. By coding the variables this way, the regression intercept gives us an estimate of the mean implicit association for a hypothetical person who has *no* self-gender association, and no self-party association. In other words, the intercept is our estimate of the average size of the culturally-induced party-gender association. (This corresponds to a political independent with no gender, which obviously does not correspond to any actual person. This estimate is useful, however, because it purges the raw IAT scores of

their self-concept-induced associations; it gives us, in other words, an estimate of the average culturally-induced association between the parties and gender. See Bartels (2000) for an analogous approach to purging candidate trait ratings of partisan projection.)

Table 4 presents this regression analysis, in the first column. As expected—and as implied by figure 4—there is a substantively large and statistically-significant interaction between respondent partisanship and gender, such that male Republicans and female Democrats show a stronger party-gender association in the hypothesized direction, and female Republicans and male Democrats show a weaker association. The item of primary interest in this analysis, however, is the intercept, which is the estimate of the average culturally-induced party-gender association, purged of self-concept related associations. This association is estimated in this model as 0.134—slightly larger than the average raw association ($p<0.001$).

This is a moderate association of male with Republican and female with Democrat. One way to think about the magnitude of this association is to compare it with other implicit associations. Nosek and colleagues present summary information on a wide range of implicit associations collected on the same web platform as the data for this study (2007, table 2) . Of particular interest is the Gender-Career IAT. Based on data collected from almost 300,000 respondents between 2000 and 2006, Nosek and colleagues report an average IAT d-score of 0.39, indicating a net association of male with career and female with family. Our estimated party-gender association of 0.134 is just over one-third the size of this implicit gender-career association, suggesting that the culturally-induced connections between gender and the political parties has about one third the strength of the implicit gender-career stereotype among contemporary Americans.[12] Given the myriad ways that the gender-career association is embedded in contemporary gender roles, norms, and expectations, it is not surprising that the career associations with gender are stronger than the party associations with gender. Nevertheless, we would argue, while the implicit association between gender

[12] The implicit gender-science association—indicating a stronger association of men with science and women with humanities than the reverse—is of a similar magnitude to the gender-career association, with an average of 0.37, as is the average association of white with good (and black with bad), which also averages 0.37.

and party is not overwhelming, especially compared to other gender associations association, but it is nevertheless a noticeable one.

The second column of table 4 presents the same regression model, this time with a political knowledge scale included as well. This scale is based on four factual questions about politics;[13] following Zaller (1992), we use this as a proxy for habitual attention to politics. My expectation is that insofar as the party-gender association has its roots in the sorts of political discourse and trends surrounding the parties that I discuss above, those who pay more attention habitually to politics should absorb that association to a greater extent. The substantively large positive coefficient for political knowledge (0.260, p=0.001) is consistent with this expectation. Note as well that including political knowledge does little to the intercept, which is our estimate of the mean culturally-induced implicit party-gender association.[14]

Relationship between implicit and explicit party-gender associations

The study also included a pair of items designed to tap respondents *explicit* associations between the political parties and gender. These items asked:

> Do you think of the Republican and Democratic parties as equally masculine, or do you think of one party as more masculine than the other?
>
> Do you think of the Republican and Democratic parties as equally feminine, or do you think of one party as more feminine than the other?

For both questions, respondents were asked to place their opinion on a seven-point scale that ranged from "Republican Party much more masculine [feminine]" to "Democratic Party much more masculine

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[13] The multiple-choice questions asked respondents to identify George H. W. Bush's vice president (Dan Quayle); the percentage of each house of congress necessary to override a presidential veto (2/3); which political party is considered more conservative (Republicans); and which party controlled the House of Representatives during the study (Democrats). With correct answers scored one and incorrect zero, the overall mean scale score was 0.75. Scores were rescaled to have mean of zero (range –0.75 to 0.25), so that the intercept term in the regression would estimate the mean implicit association for a respondent with average political knowledge.

[14] There is no evidence of an interaction between political knowledge and gender, partisanship, or their combination. There is also no noticeable effect for respondent age or education, and the inclusion of age and/or education in the regression does essentially nothing to my estimate of the average implicit association.

[feminine]."[15] Respondents were also asked to rate how well each of a series of traits describe each party in turn: moral, honest, provides strong leadership, decisive, cares about people like me, masculine, and feminine. These trait items had a four-point response scale with responses labeled "extremely well," "quite well," "not too well," and "not well at all."

I combined the two items that ask respondents to rate the relative masculinity and femininity of the parties into a single, explicit measure by subtracting the masculinity rating from the femininity rating. The resulting variable is coded from –1 to +1, with higher scores indicating a stronger explicit association of Republicans with masculinity and Democrats with femininity.

The mean of this measure of explicit party-gender associations is +0.31, indicating a substantial association of Republicans with male and Democrats with female. More than two-thirds of respondents (68.6 percent) are above the zero mid-point, indicating that they hold an explicit association in the hypothesized direction. About a quarter (27.1 percent) of respondents are at zero, indicating no explicit association between the parties and gender, and less than five percent of respondents indicate that they associate the parties with gender in the opposite direction (4.3 percent have scores less than zero). Thus, where the implicit association between parties and gender is relatively moderate, there is a rather strong—and relatively broadly-held—explicit association between the parties and gender in the hypothesized direction.

The raw individual-level correlation between implicit and explicit associations is moderately positive (rho=0.28), which is consistent with the moderate correlations of implicit and explicit attitudes found in prior research. For example, Nosek and colleagues report that the average of implicit-explicit correlations for social group attitudes is 0.27 and for group-trait stereotypes is 0.18. Thus, for example, implicit and explicit measures of gender-career associations correlate 0.16 and gender-science correlate 0.22; implicit and

[15] Intermediate options were labeled "moderately more," "slightly more," with the middle option labeled "Both parties equally masculine [feminine]."

explicit measures of racial attitudes correlate 0.31. In contrast, for explicitly political attitudes the correlation between implicit and explicit is generally higher; for example, implicit and explicit measures of presidential preference were correlated 0.71 in 2004 and 0.75 in 2000.

Figure 7 shows the explicit association, separately by respondent gender and partisanship. In this case we see a much set of differences across groups: Democratic women and Republican men do have a slightly stronger tendency explicit to associate the parties with gender in the expected direction, though the differences are relatively small and all groups have a net positive explicit association.

Table 5 presents a series of regressions that predict individual-level explicit associations. The first replicates the analysis of implicit attitudes presented in table 4 (second column, including political information). This shows what we would expect from the figure: gender and partisanship have much smaller impact on explicit associations, and the estimate of the mean association, purged of gender and partisanship effects is essentially the same as the raw association (0.29 compared with 0.31). This is consistent with Greenwald and colleagues' findings (2002) that the "triangle" pattern of associations involving the self are generally much stronger for implicit than explicit ratings. The large and statistically significant coefficient for political knowledge indicates—as I would expect—that those who are habitually attentive to politics hold stronger explicit associations between the parties and gender, just as they hold stronger implicit associations as well.

The second column includes each individual's implicit association as a predictor of their explicit associations. There are two interesting results in this model. First, implicit associations have a substantial impact on explicit ($b=0.154$, $p<0.01$). While the relatively modest correlation between implicit and explicit suggests that they are not measuring precisely the same thing, the two attitudes are related in important ways. Second, once implicit attitudes are included in the model, the already-modest effects of respondent partisanship and gender are reduced essentially to zero. Thus, the explicit party-gender associations seem to

be much less shaped by the connections among respondents' self-concept, the parties, and gender, and what shaping there is appears to be moderated entirely by the implicit associations.[16]

Table 6 presents summary statistics for the series of explicit party trait questions. These were created by subtracting respondents' rating of the Democratic Party on each trait from their rating of the Republican Party. All are coded to run from –1 to +1, with larger scores indicating that the trait better describes the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. On average, the Republican party is seen as less empathetic (caring), honest, and moral, and as being more decisive. The parties are rated equally strong leaders.[17] With the exception of the leadership trait, these mean associations are consistent with the gendering of the parties: Democrats are rated higher on the stereotypically-feminine traits of empathy, honesty, and morality, while the Republicans are rated as more decisive—as stereotypically masculine trait. Not surprisingly given the results we've seen so far, Republicans are also rated as more masculine and Democrats as more feminine.

Finally, table 7 presents a final model of the determinants of explicit party-gender associations, which treat the various trait ratings as predictors of the aggregate association. This model explicit party-gender associations as a function of the implicit association and a series of explicitly-measures traits from table 6, along with fully-interacted respondent partisanship and gender. The results indicate that the gendered traits influence the overall association in the ways we might expect. Insofar as respondents rate Republicans as more decisive, for example, they rate the Republicans as more masculine and less feminine than the Democrats ($b=0.091$, $p<0.05$), and insofar as the rate the Republicans as stronger leaders,

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[16] Running the regression model this way implies that implicit association cause explicit. In fact, the causal relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes is complex, with each most likely influencing the other. This model should not be taken, therefore, as a definitive statement about the causal ordering of implicit and explicit in the context of party and gender attitudes. However, it does suggest that the self-concept associations appear to operate primarily or entirely through implicit—not explicit—associations, at least in this domain.

[17] The strong leader trait appears to be driven almost entirely by respondent partisanship; as such, respondents appear to be treating that trait as if they were simply asked which party they prefer.

compared to the Democrats, they also rate the Republicans as more masculine and less feminine ($b=0.083$, $p<0.05$). Conversely, respondents who rate Republicans as more honest than Democrats—a stereotypically feminine trait—tend to rate the Republican Party as less masculine and more feminine relative to the Democrats ($b=-0.097$, $p<0.10$). Ratings of morality and of empathy are less connected with overall masculinity-femininity ratings. In addition, the model in the first column also indicates that even above and beyond the effects of these explicit comparative trait ratings, the strength of *implicit* masculine-Republican/feminine-Democrat associations continues to exert a strong influence on the explicit association ($b=0.144$, $p<0.01$).

Discussion

This preliminary study has demonstrated that respondents associate the Republican Party with masculinity, and the Democratic Party with femininity to a greater extent than the reverse association. This holds strongly for explicit associations. In addition, there is a moderate, but systematic, implicit association as well; this implicit association is shaped both by the cultural association of the parties with genders and by respondents' associations of themselves with a gender and with the parties. The explicit and implicit gender associations of the parties are only loosely related, with a correlation of 0.28; this is a product of their different relationships with the self, to be sure, but implies that there are other sources of differentiation as well.

In general, there are two classes of reasons that implicit and explicit measures of associations will diverge. First, respondents may be *unable* to report reliably on their associations, because they lack introspective access to those associations. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) were the first to present compelling theoretical and empirical evidence to support the idea—now conventional wisdom in social psychology—that we lack special introspective access to our mental processes (see also Wilson 2002; Bargh and Morsella 2008; Dijksterhuis and Nordgren 2006). Second, respondents may be *unwilling* to report attitudes and associations of which they are aware. There are, of course, a range of response factors that can intervene

between attitude and report, ranging from awareness of social norms to demand characteristics of the survey instrument. The role of social norms figures prominently in accounts of the role of implicit racial attitudes, where social and individually-held norms against racism can interfere with whites' honest reporting of negative attitudes toward blacks.

In the case of party-gender associations, I understand the differences between implicit and explicit associations—and in particular the different role played by self-concept for implicit and explicit—as a sort of demand characteristic, but one that is not simply a methodological artifact. I want to argue that when people are asked explicitly "which party is more masculine" and "which party is more feminine," they construct their response based on the plausible or reasonable-seeming things that come to mind. This is consistent with Nisbett and Wilson's argument that people's reports of their own mental processes derive not from direct inspection of those processes, but rather from a post-hoc construction of plausible processes that seem to underlie their attitudes. For explicit questions about associations between the parties and masculinity and femininity, ideas about the self don't seem relevant, plausible, and/or reasonable as bases for that opinion, so they are edited out or ignored through some combination of conscious and unconsciously processes.

So with the explicit measure, people are reporting essentially their knowledge of the American cultural stereotypes that link the contemporary parties with gendered traits. Given the lack of strong norms against associating the parties with genders, I would expect relatively little self-censorship, and we observe the large majority of respondents willing to rate the Republican Party as more masculine and less feminine than the Democratic Party.

With the implicit measure, on the other hand, people cannot edit out the self-involved associations, and we measure a combination of the cultural stereotype (much of which is probably available to conscious introspection) plus the self-related associations (which are less available to conscious introspection, and/or are edited out). So for implicit measures we observe large differences across respondent party and gender categories, consistent with Greenwald and colleagues' unified theory. So,

male Republicans and female Democrats have the strongest implicit association in the predicted direction, and those in the opposite categories—female Republicans and male Democrats—actually report net implicit associations in the *opposite* direction.

For both explicit and implicit, individual-level political knowledge strongly predicts the association, suggesting that both are driven in part by awareness of the gender associations in that appear in contemporary political discourse and culture.

Given these points of disjuncture between implicit and explicit associations, the obvious next question is whether these associations affect other political judgments and behaviors, and if so, whether implicit and explicit drive *different* other judgments and behaviors. We might expect, for example, that quick, gut-reaction impressions of political candidates, might be driven in noticeable ways by implicit associations, where more considered judgments might be more driven by the explicit. Given that the differences between implicit and explicit are driven in part by individual's party and gender, and given recent work suggesting that flash reactions to candidates seem to drive voting to some extent, this could create politically-interesting effects.

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Tables & Figures

Figure 1: Number of female elected officials, by party



Figure 2: Hypothesized associations



The IAT measures the difference in the strength of pairs of associations. For this analysis associations A and D are expected to be stronger than associations B and C.

Figure 3: Computer screen during an example IAT trial



Figure 4: Mean Implicit party-gender association, by respondent partisanship and gender



Figure 5: Associations among self, party, and gender for a hypothetical male Democrat



Figure 6: Self-induced and culture-induced associations between party and gender



Figure 7: Mean Explicit party-gender association, by respondent partisanship and gender



Table 1: IAT party stimuli

Republican Party	*Democratic Party*
	
	
	

Table 2: IAT gender stimuli

Female	*Male*
She	He
Her	Him
Mother	Father
Daughter	Son
Woman	Man
Girl	Boy
Female	Male

Table 3: Order of IAT Blocks

Block	*Left*	*Right*	*Trials*
1.	Female	Male	20
2.	Democrat	Republican	20
3.	Democrat (or) Female	Republican (or) Male	20 training 40 measurement
4.	Male	Female	40
5.	Democrat (or) Male	Republican (or) Female	20 training 40 measurement

Respondents randomly received the blocks in the order listed, or with 1 & 4 and 3 & 5 reversed.

Table 4: Predictors of implicit party-gender association

	Implicit Association	
Gender (1=Male, –1=Female)	0.111**	0.095**
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Republican	0.001	–0.027
	(0.051)	(0.051)
Democrat	–0.068	–0.092*
	(0.044)	(0.045)
Republican × Gender	0.288**	0.290**
	(0.051)	(0.050)
Democrat × Gender	–0.321**	–0.312**
	(0.044)	(0.044)
Political Knowledge	–	0.260**
		(0.075)
Intercept	0.134**	0.146**
	(0.031)	(0.031)
N	694	694
R-squared	0.19	0.21
Std error of regression	0.49	0.48

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed

Table 5: Predictors of explicit party-gender association

	Explicit Association	
Gender (1=Male, –1=Female)	0.030	0.016
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Republican	0.017	0.021
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Democrat	0.010	0.024
	(0.030)	(0.029)
Republican × Gender	0.054	0.009
	(0.034)	(0.034)
Democrat × Gender	–0.072*	–0.024
	(0.030)	(0.030)
Political Knowledge	0.191**	0.151**
	(0.051)	(0.050)
Implicit Association	–	0.154**
		(0.025)
Intercept	0.297**	0.274**
	(0.021)	(0.021)
N	694	694
R-squared	0.05	0.10
Std error of regression	0.33	0.32

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$; ^ $p<0.10$ two tailed

Table 6: Explicit party trait ratings

Variable	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*N*
Republicans more caring	–0.195	0.476	775
Republicans more decisive	0.160	0.357	771
Republicans more honest	–0.108	0.377	769
Republicans stronger leaders	0.013	0.412	771
Republicans more moral	–0.075	0.434	768
Republicans more masculine	0.197	0.303	769
Republicans more feminine	–0.248	0.304	770

Table 7: Predictors of explicit party-gender associations

	Explicit Association
Implicit Association	0.142** (0.026)
Republicans more caring	–0.026 (0.041)
Republicans more decisive	0.094* (0.039)
Republicans more honest	–0.094^ (0.052)
Republicans stronger leaders	0.083* (0.041)
Republicans more moral	0.000 (0.040)
Gender (1=Male, –1=Female)	0.019 (0.021)
Republican	0.032 (0.039)
Democrat	0.014 (0.033)
Republican × Gender	0.009 (0.034)
Democrat × Gender	–0.028 (0.031)
Political Knowledge	0.124* (0.052)
Intercept	0.248** (0.023)
N	675
R-squared	0.13
Std error of regression	0.32

Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed