Autonomy, and Masculinity, and the American Values of Limited Government and Individualism

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Gender has structured the operation of American politics since the very founding of the country. The very definition of "the political" has been run through with ideas about gender. At times this has been explicit: until 1920, of course, in the vast majority of the country only men could vote, only men could hold office, only men were, therefore, fully citizens. Gender has operated in more subtle ways as well to shape American ideas about politics. This means that while suffrage was an important watershed, gender played a complex and important role in shaping the conduct of—and understanding of—politics, political issues, and citizenship well before the suffrage movement, and continued to do so after women were enfranchised. This long history of gender shaping politics and political concepts means that while formal gender inequalities in politics are gone, and even though qualified female candidates can and do win their elections, gendered assumptions nevertheless continue to shape in ways both subtle and far reaching how we understand politics, how we evaluate political candidates, and how we think about political issues.

Much work—some of it modeled on research on race—has explored gender and public opinion in terms of differences between men and women, or the gender gap. However, the political and psychological mechanisms underlying gender's political effects differs from those that govern the politics surrounding other social cleavages, such as race and class. This has obscured gender's role from the view of ordinary citizens, political leaders, and political scientists alike. This book will argue that the unique social organization of gender and its centrality in social life give rise to a "psychology of gender": a rich set of cognitive categories with deep-seated associations that fundamentally shape our perceptions, evaluations, and actions in the social world. When we encounter others in social life we automatically perceive and evaluate them not simply as people, but as gendered people: as particular types of men and women. Moreover, because gender categories (and their associations) are rooted very deeply psychologically, we apply them automatically and very broadly. They lend meaning metaphorically to, and thereby drive inferences about, a very broad range of objects beyond actual men and actual women.

Gender matters, therefore, in many realms of social interaction, including, perhaps most importantly, in politics.

Because gender stereotypes about masculinity and femininity operate automatically and subconsciously, their effects are easy to miss. We generally believe we are seeing things as they "really are"; we do not notice the ways that stereotypes of all sorts shape our perceptions. In the case of gender stereotypes, this invisibility is particularly ironic, since gender stereotypes have at their core a set of beliefs and prescriptions about power relations—the very stuff of politics. Yet we are apt to overlook the political operation of this "psychology of gender" because gender is only rarely the object of interest-based contention between men and women, in public, over resource allocation. That is, with notable exceptions at a few historical moments, politics is not usually organized around conflict between men and women over issues of gender. Both gender and politics deal in power, but they do so by very different logics. It is easy, therefore, for gender to seem absent from politics, to seem to operate pre-politically as a feature of intimate domestic life.

Several lines of psychological, sociological, and historical research and theorizing argue that beliefs about gender and gender relations are a product of the social structure of gender (e.g. Jackman 1994; Sigel 1996; Gurin 1987; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007; Fiske and Stevens 1993)(Winter 2008). In contrast with race relations, gender is not generally given meaning through spatial segregation. Most people first learn about gender roles in gender-integrated families; most children attend gender-integrated schools; most media and other popular culture portrays men and women together; and men and women generally live together as romantic partners and spouses. Women are, in the words of Simone de Beauvoir, "dispersed among the males" (1989, xxv). This social structuring of gender facilitates the development of beliefs—or gender ideologies—that emphasize the economic, social, and emotional interdependence of men and women, and that locate gender difference in role differentiation within gender-integrated contexts. In turn, this makes more difficult the development of a

sense of group interest or linked fate among women (and among men). Gender beliefs, again in contrast with beliefs about race, thereby often have a warm emotional tone, at least on the surface.

These structural and ideological frameworks make it difficult for women—and men, for that matter—to develop concepts about gender-based interests. They also motivate individuals to preserve warm relations between men and women. Moreover, because gender is learned and enacted first and foremost in the intimate setting of the family, it carries with it an association with the private realm that makes it hard to organize gender-based collective political action. Of course, there are times and places where these barriers are overcome; a central task of the second-wave women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, was to develop and promote gender consciousness among women precisely to counter these pressures. But for most people, most of the time, there is extraordinary pressure *not* to understand gender in a collective, group-interested way. For example, Roberta Sigel documents the ways that many of the women in her focus groups were aware of discrimination against women, but went to great rhetorical and psychological lengths to understand that discrimination in individual terms that did not promote group advocacy or action on public policy (1996).

This arrangement creates incentives not to promote issues that pit men and women against each other as oppositional groups, but rather to frame issues in other ways or simply to keep gender issues off the agenda. Examining a broad range of gender issues, Sanbonmatsu shows that "while reproductive rights issues have become extremely partisan, other gender issues such as women's labor force participation and their entry into politics have not" (2002, 2).[1] Given mass-level ambivalence among both men and women about gender-role change, neither party has placed great emphasis on gender issues,

[1] Abortion is a bit of an exception: several scholars have shown that since 1980 the parties have polarized at the elite level on abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (Wolbrecht 2000; Freeman 1987; Costain 1991), and Greg Adams demonstrates that this elite polarization on abortion, coupled with clear signals from the parties on the issue, has spawned some degree of mass-level partisan realignment (1997). However, as Sanbonmatsu and others discuss, abortion is atypical of most other gender issues in its politics and opinion.

leading Sanbonmatsu to conclude that abortion is the exception and that "dramatic changes that have occurred in gender roles have not been absorbed into the party system" (2002, 220).[2]

These considerations might suggest that gender is relatively tangential to mainstream American partisan politics. However, gender has other effects, but the mechanisms for these processes are different from the ones that drive traditional partisan alignment (and issue evolution). That is, gender matters, but *not* because the parties taking opposite sides on a range of gender issues that polarize men from women. Despite a small to moderate-sized gender gap in partisanship, voting, and public opinion on some issues, partisan politics is nevertheless not, generally speaking, a "battle of the sexes." Rather, gender energizes politics in part by giving emotional power to beliefs about *different types* of men and *different types* of women.

Normative masculinity and the government

Specifically, In this paper I argue I explore the ways that hegemonic visions of normative masculinity have shaped discourse on individualism and limited government. I suggest that when Americans think about the relationship between government and the people, and the proper scope of government in people's lives, their thinking is shaped by ideas about gender and gender roles. On the one hand, peoples' ideas about citizens and citizenship are gendered: Americans have different implicit ideas about male and female citizens. On the other, people's thinking about government often operates metaphorically, with the government understood metonymically as a (male or female) person, depending on the policy under consideration and the framing of the discussion. In combination, this means that citizens' thoughts and feelings about the relationship between government and citizen will depend critically on their beliefs and feelings about *interpersonal* interactions between men and women.

[2] Mendelberg makes a related argument that gender—unlike race—does not present incentives to the parties to craft *implicit* appeals (Mendelberg 2001).

Many scholars have explored the ways that American notions of citizenship are gendered. For the first century and a half of American history, of course, that central right of citizenship—the vote—was restricted to men. More broadly, feminist political theorists have explored the ways that ideas about the prototypical liberal democratic citizen is understood to have male characteristics (e.g. Hirschmann 2003; Okin 1979; Young 1995), and historians have documented the ways that those gendered concepts have shaped the practice of politics in explicitly and symbolically masculine ways throughout American history (Ritter 2006; Smith-Rosenberg 1986; Kann 1998, 1999; Hoganson 1998; Glenn 2002; Bederman 1995). At the same time, Americans have developed ideas for, and women have enacted, specifically female political or quasi-political roles. These "female" political roles have included, for example, the nineteenth-century "Republican Mother," whose role was to socialize their sons and husbands into proper citizens (Kerber 1986; Bloch 1987; Lewis 1987), and a vibrant history of social and moral activism (Baker 1984; Skocpol 1992) that laid the foundation for suffrage. In addition, Suzanne Mettler has argued that New Deal social welfare policy created two classes of gendered citizens: a national liberal citizenship for independent male breadwinners and a state-level illiberal citizenship for dependent women (1998). This means that when people think about "Americans" or about "American citizens," they inevitably—though often implicitly—think about "American men" and "American women"; about male citizens and female citizens.

On the other hand, complex abstract concepts—such as the state or a nation—are frequently understood metaphorically; and personification—the conceptualization of a complex entity as a human individual—is a frequent and easy move.[3] Caroll Smith-Rosenberg discusses this phenomonen in the thinking of the founders, who conceptualized the state in terms of a range of economic individuals:

> Analogies such as "Honest nations, like honest men," "Contracting nations ... like individuals," which were commonplace … suggested, not a traditional civic humanist

[3] Indeed, Lakoff and Johnson argue that *all* abstract concepts are inherently understood metaphorically (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; see also McGraw and Dolan 2007)

> relation of state authority and subject deference, but an inversion of traditional hierarchical distinctions. As a result, **the political state** not only became like its individual subjects; it **became subject to and modeled upon specific kinds of economic subjects**—merchants, shopkeepers, money dealers. (Smith-Rosenberg 1992, 852)

Therefore, when people think about the relationship of government and "the people," their thinking is therefore shaped by their ideas about gender relations in the private sphere. Exactly how this takes place, however, depends on the policy area at hand. In prior work I have collected data showing that Americans view policy domains as having distinct genders as well: defense is extremely masculine; the environment is quite feminine, for example.[4] The interaction between the "gender" of government and the "gender" of citizens subject to a policy will lead different citizens to have very different reactions to the general question of government power. In the realm of firearms (a very masculine realm), for example, gender-traditional male citizens are apt to view government action as a symbolically masculine threat to their own personal autonomy. Those same citizens, however, might find quite appropriate a strong, patriarchal government role over dependent, symbolically female, citizens in the realm of welfare policy.

Many historical accounts of American politics point to the ways that gendered language and gendered metaphors are deployed in political discourse.

Various scholars, for example, have pointed to the ways that the founding fathers held deeply gendered notions of citizenship. What it meant to be a good citizen—independent, virtuous, self-controlled—was intimately bound up in what it meant to be a good man (Kann 1998)[other refs]. Indeed, the founders worried greatly that men would not be up to the task demanded of them as self-governing citizens; an important element of their solution to that problem lay in the socializing effects that women, cast as "Republican Mothers" and "Republican Wives," were expected to have on "their" men (Kerber 1986, 1992; Lewis 1987; Bloch 1987).

[4] Some of these results are reported in Winter (2010).

Indeed, these gendered metaphors were not always implicit. For example, several anti-Federalist writers cast the strong Federal government of the Constitution as a sexual threat to independent citizens' women:

> [S]uppose the excise or revenue officers … having a warrant to search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman, and searched under her shift, suppose, I say, that they commit similar, or greater indignities … What refuge shall we then have to shelter us from the iron hand of arbitrary power?[5]

Similarly, "A Son of Liberty" enumerated "a few of the curses which will be entailed upon the people of America" if the Constitution were adopted, including:

> Excise laws established, by which our bed chambers will be subjected to be searched by brutal tools of power, under pretence, that they contain contraband or smuggled merchandize, and the most delicate part of our families liable to every species of rude or indecent treatment, without the least prospect, or shadow of redress, from those by whom they are commissioned.[6]

Moreover, the fear here is rooted in the contestation between men over women:

> This power, exercised without limitation, will introduce itself into every corner of the city, and country—It will wait upon the ladies at their toilett *[sic],* and will not leave them in any of their domestic concerns … it will enter the house of every gentleman … it will attend him to his bed-chamber, and watch him while he sleeps **… It appears to me a solecism, for two men, or bodies of men, to have unlimited power respecting the same object.** It contradicts the scripture maxim, which saith, "no man can serve two masters," the one power or the other must prevail …[7]

Moving to public opinion

All of this suggests that gendered metaphors and imagery pervade discussion of politics at various points in American history, and that relations between citizens and government in particular are framed in ways that evoke relations between men and women, and between men and other men, in the intimate sphere.

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[5] "A Democratic Federalist," *Pennsylvania Herald*, 17 October 1787.

[6] "A Son of Liberty," *New York Journal*, 8 November 1787.

[7] "Brutus VI," *New York Journal*, 27 December 1787; emphasis is mine.

My interest is in tracing the effects of this sort of common imagery in the opinions of modern Americans about the role of the government in their lives. That is, do the sorts of metaphors I have been discussing move beyond the rhetorical realm; do they induce ordinary Americans to project their feelings and anxieties about gender relations onto their relationship with the federal government?

Measuring masculinity ideology

My claim is that individual's views on the importance of personal autonomy, and their beliefs about the proper behavior and place of men and women in the private sphere should shape their opinions on questions of government policy that do not directly implicate gender or gender relations. To assess this, I need measures of beliefs about gendered interpersonal relationships. I focus in particular on two concepts: psychological need for autonomy, and beliefs about the norms that governing the male role. My expectation is that those citizens who feel a particularly sharp need for autonomy in their personal affairs will be apt to react negatively to government policies that threaten to interfere, objectively or symbolically, with their ability to act independently. In addition, I expect that citizens who believe that men should fill very traditional roles will be more likely to see active government policies as a existentially threatening, and therefore more likely to oppose an active government role. This effect should be conditioned by the gender of the actors in the metaphor of government action. When the government is metaphorically a man threatening to interfere in the realm of another (metaphorical) man's autonomy, then those who value autonomy and traditional male roles should oppose those policies. On the other hand, those who support traditional male roles and who value autonomy should be less threatened by government intervention in cases where the government is a metaphorical man who proposes to shape the behavior of a (metaphorical or actual) woman, or to discipline the behavior of a (metaphorical or actual) man who himself fails to live up to the demands of masculine independence and autonomy.[8]

[8] TBA: Link with Mark Kann's "grammar of manhood" among the founders (Kann 1998).

Psychological need for autonomy

I need measures of these concepts that refer to the psychological and personal, and that are as devoid as possible of political content or references. For autonomy, I turn to the a measure developed in the study of depression and psychopathology: the Autonomy scale of Bieling and colleagues' Sociotropy-Autonomy battery (Bieling et al. 2000). This scale has been used primarily in the counseling and clinical psychological study of personal adjustment and depression. I draw on two subscales of the overall Autonomy scale. The first, Independent Goal Attainment (IGA), measures the intrinsic value a person finds in achieving their goals, independent of any praise or approbation they might receive from others. It includes items such as, "If a goal is important to me I will pursue it even if it may make other people uncomfortable," and "When I achieve a goal I get more satisfaction from reaching the goal than from any praise I might get."

The second aspect of Autonomy is Sensitivity to Others' Control (SOC), which, as the name suggests, measures people's discomfort with being controlled by others. It includes items such as, "I prefer to make my own plans, so I am not controlled by others," and "I don't like to answer personal questions because they feel like an invasion of my privacy." The clinical versions of these scales contain 11 Independent Goal Attainment items and 17 items measuring sensitivity to others' control. Based on pre-testing, I selected three IGA items and four SOC items for inclusion in my survey.[9]

Masculine role attitudes

For the second set of construct, beliefs about traditional masculine roles, I need measures that explore a respondents *beliefs about* the male role; not measures of a man's gendered self-concept. That is, I am not interested in whether a man believes that he lives up to traditional masculine role norms; rather, I want to know, for both men and women, whether they endorse those norms as a model. For this I draw on the "Male Role Norms Scale" developed by Thompson and Pleck (1986). This scale includes three

[9] Appendix contains complete wording of the items.

subscales that measure three elements of traditional male prescriptions: that men have high status (Status subscale; for example, "A man always deserves the respect of his wife and children."), that men be tough (Toughness subscale; for example, "Nobody respects a man very much who frequently talks about his worries, fears, and problems."), and that men reject anything female or feminine (anti-Femininity subscale; for example, "I might find it a little silly or embarrassing if a male friend of mine cried over a sad love scene in a movie.").[10] Based on pre-testing I selected four items each from the Status, Toughness, and anti-Femininity subscales.

Data collection

I collected data using a web survey, hosted on the web site of the University of Virginia Political Cognition Laboratory.[11] I recruited participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk; 501 participants completed the survey on March 26, 2014.[12] Mechanical Turk, or "mTurk" is an online labor market run by Amazon.com, in which employers ("requesters" in mTurk) post jobs and participants (called "workers" in mTurk) choose which tasks to complete. The use of mTurk for social science research is exploding; though the participants do not represent a representative sample of any population, they are significantly more diverse that the college student samples that they are rapidly displacing. There is a growing body of literature on the use of mTurk that suggests that participants are generally quite diverse—though not nationally representative—and attentive and careful in completing research studies. In addition, a wide range of classic psychological findings have been replicated using mTurk (Berinsky et al.)[refs][TBA: more stock language on Mechanical Turk].

I restricted my study to mTurk workers in the United States who hold approval ratings on prior work above 97%. My participants, as is typical of mTurk samples, are more liberal than Americans as a

[10] TBA: More complete discussion of male role norms and their measurement.

[11] UVa PCL's website is http://policog.politics.virginia.edu; the survey is hosted using the open-source Limesurvey package (http://www.limesurvey.org).

[12] The survey took approximately 10–15 minutes to complete, and participants were compensated $0.75.

whole; are somewhat younger (median age = 30); are better educated (47% are college graduates); and are skewed male (67% of my sample is male). 83% of my sample identifies as white, 7% as African American, 6% as Asian, and 6% as Latino.[13] Demographic descriptive statistics for the sample appear in Table 1.

In addition to the Autonomy and Male Role Norm items discussed above, my survey included a range of measure drawn from the American National Election Studies, including a series of policy opinion measures, scales that measure political values including egalitarianism, support for limited government, moral traditionalism, racial resentment, trust in government; plus party identification and a standard set of demographic questions.

Results

In the analyses that follow, I explore the role of autonomy and male role norms in shaping political values, including individualism and limited government, as well as moral traditionalism, egalitarianism, and racial resentment; and in shaping policy opinion. To do so, I run a series of regression models. For the political values models, I regress each value in turn on my measures of autonomy and endorsement of male role norms along with a series of control variables that include party identification, racial identification (as a series of dummy variables for Black, Asian, and Latino), southern residence (a dummy variable for residence in the former confederate states[14]), dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is a student, and whether the respondent is a college graduate, and gender. All variables are coded to run from 0 to 1; models are estimated by OLS.

Precursors of support for individualism and limited government

The models in Table 2 show that the explicitly political values generally included in ANES studies themselves are rooted in interesting ways in the "prepolitical" values of autonomy and male role

[13] The numbers add to more than 100% because respondents were allowed to select more than one racial identification.

[14] Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North, Carolina, South, Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia

norms. Moreover, these connections are fairly specific: they vary in meaningful ways across the different political values. In the first column, the model for limited government indicates that it is connected with the toughness subscale of male role norms, with a coefficient of 0.305 ($p<0.05$). This indicates that those who view toughness as an important attribute among men are notably more likely to endorse the notion that the federal government should be less active generally. On the other hand, endorsement of economic individualism is connected with the status subscale ($b=0.255$, $p<0.01$) and to a lesser extent with independent goal attainment ($b=0.148$, $p<0.05$). There is a smaller, and statistically less clear, relationship with sensitivity to others' control as well, albeit a negative one ($b=–0.121$, $p<0.10$).

Racial resentment is also tied with personal gender values in a number ways: there is a large effect for status and a smaller one for independent goal attainment ($b=0254$, $p<0.01$; and $b=0.152$, $p<0.01$, respectively). Interestingly, racial resentment is also higher among those who reject men's engagement with the feminine ($b=0.177$,$p<0.05$). The status and anti-femininity results, taken together, suggest that endorsement of white superiority is connected in important ways with endorsement of male superiority as well. Egalitarianism is connected negatively with toughness and anti-femininity ($b=–0.0261$ and $b=–0.166$, both $p<0.01$), as we might expect. Finally, moral traditionalism is stronger among those who endorse high male status ($b=0.118$, $p<0.05$) and especially among those who reject femininity in men ($b=0.339$, $p<0.01$); but *lower* among those who endorse autonomy (IGA $b=–0.171$, $p<0.01$; SOC $b=–0.114$, $p<0.10$). This might indicate that moral traditionalism is connected importantly with authoritarianism, which, emphasizes the importance both of traditional morality as well as authoritarian submission to (legitimate) authority (Adorno et al. 1950; Brown 1965; Stenner 2005).

Gendered beliefs and domestic policy

Table 3 (and Figure 1) present the results from models of eight domestic policy opinions, including the standard ANES items on government efforts to ensure people have jobs and an adequate standard of living; the trade-off between federal spending and services; the importance of deficit reduction; whether federal law should make guns easier or harder to obtain; and four issues related to gays

and lesbians: support for same sex marriage, employment antidiscrimination laws, service in the military, and adoption.[15] These models include the autonomy and male role variables, the full set of ANES political values, and the demographics discussed above. It should be noted that inclusion of a full suite of political values measures in the model represents a tough test for the autonomy and male role measures, because they are fairly highly correlated with the values and likely have some of their effect indirectly through the more politicized values.

Considering first the two domestic economic issues, we see that the political values operate as we would expect: endorsement of limited government and rejection of egalitarianism are both closely related to holding conservative views on these policies; economic individualism and racial resentment have smaller impacts on the jobs and standard of living item, and moral traditionalism has a smaller impact on the spending/services trade-off. In this realm, however, views on masculine autonomy and male role norms have no impact on opinion: the coefficients are all substantively small, vary seemingly randomly from measure to measure, and are never statistically significant. Turning to deficit reduction, again values matter as we would expect: endorsement of limited government increases belief that it is important to reduce the deficit, which makes sense because choices about the deficit directly implicate the scope of government action. Deficit beliefs are also connected with racial resentment, consistent with arguments that federal deficits are viewed by the racially resentful as caused in part by spending that benefits African Americans and other minority groups [refs]. Interestingly, beliefs about the deficit are also moderately affected by autonomy and male role beliefs. Those who rate the importance of personal autonomy higher are somewhat more concerned about the deficit (b=0.145 for IGA; b=0.143 for SOC, both $p<0.10$), suggesting that at some level concern about the deficit is tied to a sense that the debt it implies might reduce future autonomy. The effects for status, toughness, and anti-femininity are a bit harder to

[15] TBA: ANES variable names; full wording.

interpret: toughness is associated with more concern about the deficit (b=0.133, p<0.10); status and anti-femininity are associated with somewhat less (b=–0.139 & –0.161, respectively; both p<0.05).

Turning to opinion on gun laws, we see that moral traditionalism is strongly associated with opposition to gun regulation, as is the toughness scale (b=0.309, p<0.01). This rather robust effect suggests that those who endorse men being strong and tough are notably more apt to oppose gun regulation; this is consistent with claims that guns, at least in part, serve a symbolic function as symbols and implements of masculine power [refs].

Turning, finally, to the four gay and lesbian policy issues, we see relatively consistent patterns with some nuance for the different issues. Moral traditionalism is a consistent predictor of opinion, with stronger effects on the two issues—marriage and adoption—that implicate the family, and weaker, but still robust, effects on the other two that do not: anti-discrimination laws and military service. Only for opinion on anti-discrimination laws, racial resentment has a moderate effect and limited government has a small (and statistically marginal) impact; this is consistent with the racially resentful associating anti-discrimination laws for *any* group with racial anti-discrimination policy, and with some opposition coming from those who oppose government action in general. The anti-femininity male norms subscale has consistent and relatively strong impact across the four issues; this is a relatively powerful finding, given that this impact is over and above the effect of moral traditionalism, and suggests that substantial opposition to these various policies is rooted in apprehensions about the impact that gays and lesbians may have on the strict separation of male and female realms.[16] Finally, the status subscale has a moderate, negative impact on support for anti-discrimination laws: those who are more concerned that men have high status are *more* supportive of anti-discrimination laws. This finding is harder than the others to interpret.

[16] Without moral traditionalism in the model, the estimated impact of anti-femininity is substantially increased, by roughly 50 to 100 percent.

Overall, then, we see moderately-sized effects for autonomy and male role norm beliefs across a range of domestic policy questions. These effects are relatively selective: from no impact on general, domestic scope of government questions; to targeted—and logical—impacts on opinion on guns and on issues affecting gays and lesbians, to more broad effects on views about the deficit. These suggest that ideas about masculinity and autonomy matter, but that they matter only in relatively precise ways for particular issues. Clearly more work is needed to more fully map these effects and to trace their roots in the political framing of these and other issues.

Gendered beliefs and foreign policy

I included four foreign policy questions: three from the ANES that asked respondents' views on whether defense spending should be increased, whether the Afghan war was worth the cost; and whether the Afghan war has decreased the terrorist threat to the United States. In addition, I included a question, borrowed from the Pew Center, on whether the United States should take a firm stand in the Ukraine.[17]

The results, presented in Table 4 and Figure 2, are simple to summarize. My measures of autonomy and masculine role norms have no systematic effects on opinion about these matters. For the Ukraine question, there are moderately-sized estimates for the impact of anti-femininity and status, such that those who reject femininity in men are slightly more supportive of action in the Ukraine, and those who endorse the importance of male status are slightly less supportive. However, on the anti-femininity effect is in the expected direction and neither effect approaches statistically significance.

It is not clear, of course, why there are no effects here; I would have expected that endorsement of autonomy and especially hegemonic masculine roles would be associated with support for an aggressive foreign policy. It may be that these questions, with the slight exception of the Ukraine question, do not

[17] The question asked, "Thinking about the situation in Ukraine, do you think it is more important for the US to take a firm stand against Russian actions or not get involved in the situation?" The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press included this question in a national survey conducted March 20-23, 2014: http://www.people-press.org/2014/03/25/concerns-about-russia-rise-but-just-a-quarter-call-moscow-an-adversary/

tap into the dimension of how aggressive our foreign policy should be. Answers to this, of course, must await future data collection.

Conclusions and next steps

Of course, some caution is in order in generalizing from these results because the sample is not a representative sample of Americans. I take some comfort from two factors, however: first, I do not seek to generalize overall *levels* of the variables I measure, a task for which this sample would be completely inappropriate. Rather, I am interested in *relationships among* variables; for this task the relative heterogeneity of the sample is helpful and the strict representativeness less of a hindrance.[18] In addition, the findings for the variables other than autonomy and male role norms—and particularly for political values—do generally conform to the patterns we see in national samples. This does not guarantee, of course, that the same would be true for the gender measures I use, but it does increase my confidence somewhat.

With this in mind, I have uncovered some initial evidence that gendered beliefs about proper masculine traits and about the importance of personal autonomy have some relevance for a range of domestic policy questions, above and beyond the impact of traditional political predispositions and demographics.

[18] Of course, one is on even firmer ground estimating the impact of experimental treatments with this sort of sample.

Table 1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Female	0.325	0.469	501
White	0.835	0.372	502
African American	0.068	0.252	502
Asian	0.064	0.245	502
Latino	0.062	0.241	502
College graduate	0.476	0.5	500
Age	31.571	10.308	501
Some schooling, no high school diploma	0.012	0.109	500
High school graduate - high school diploma or equivalent (GED)	0.106	0.308	500
Some college, no degree	0.312	0.464	500
Associate degree	0.094	0.292	500
Bachelor's degree	0.382	0.486	500
Master's degree	0.068	0.252	500
Professional or Doctorate degree	0.026	0.159	500
Republican	0.116	0.321	499
Independent (w.leaners)	0.505	0.5	499
Democrat	0.379	0.486	499

Table 2: Models of ANES values

	ANES Limited Government	*ANES Economic Individualism*	*ANES Racial Resentment*	*ANES Egalitarianism*	*ANES Moral Traditionalism*
Autonomy–Indep. Goal Attainment subscale	0.114 (0.124)	0.148* (0.071)	0.152^ (0.080)	0.041 (0.069)	–0.171** (0.065)
Autonomy–Sensitivity to others' control subscale	0.131 (0.120)	–0.121^ (0.069)	0.075 (0.078)	0.026 (0.067)	–0.114^ (0.063)
Male Role Norms Scale–Status subscale	0.083 (0.111)	0.255** (0.064)	0.254** (0.072)	–0.070 (0.062)	0.118* (0.058)
Male Role Norms Scale–Toughness subscale	0.305* (0.123)	0.113 (0.070)	0.127 (0.079)	–0.261** (0.069)	0.066 (0.065)
Male Role Norms Scale–Antifemininity subscale	0.104 (0.111)	0.007 (0.064)	0.177* (0.072)	–0.171** (0.062)	0.339** (0.058)
Republican	0.199** (0.057)	0.074* (0.033)	0.139** (0.037)	–0.166** (0.032)	0.171** (0.030)
Democrat	–0.264** (0.037)	0.022 (0.021)	–0.086** (0.024)	0.090** (0.021)	–0.042* (0.020)
Student	–0.022 (0.042)	0.064** (0.024)	–0.031 (0.027)	0.008 (0.023)	–0.058** (0.022)
African American	0.053 (0.072)	0.017 (0.041)	–0.082^ (0.047)	0.005 (0.040)	0.057 (0.038)
Asian	0.103 (0.071)	0.073^ (0.041)	0.019 (0.046)	–0.065 (0.040)	–0.009 (0.038)
Latino	–0.002 (0.070)	0.037 (0.041)	–0.011 (0.046)	0.054 (0.039)	0.022 (0.037)
South (Deep and Peripheral)	–0.056 (0.037)	–0.017 (0.022)	0.018 (0.024)	0.003 (0.021)	0.001 (0.020)
Income	0.043* (0.022)	0.036** (0.013)	0.041** (0.014)	–0.029* (0.012)	0.014 (0.011)
College graduate	–0.073* (0.035)	–0.012 (0.020)	–0.054* (0.023)	0.016 (0.019)	–0.011 (0.018)
Female	0.011 (0.040)	0.011 (0.023)	0.013 (0.026)	–0.013 (0.022)	0.025 (0.021)
Intercept	0.116 (0.118)	0.217** (0.068)	0.030 (0.076)	0.862** (0.066)	0.281** (0.062)
N	486	485	486	485	485
r2	0.26	0.17	0.29	0.33	0.35
rmse	0.37	0.21	0.24	0.21	0.20

** $p<0.01$; * $p<0.05$; ^ $p<0.10$ two tailed

Table 3: Domestic Policy

	Oppose govt effort on jobs & std of living	*Cut spending, fewer services*	*Deficit important*	*Loosen gun laws*	*Oppose same sex marriage*	*Oppose antidiscrimination laws for gays/lesbians*	*Oppose gays in military*	*Oppose gay/lesbian adoption*
ANES Limited Government	0.257**	0.252**	0.153**	0.166**	–0.011	0.064^	0.023	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.040)
ANES Economic Individualism	0.111*	0.048	0.037	–0.102	0.051	–0.090	–0.108*	–0.013
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.066)
ANES Racial Resentment	0.114*	0.074	0.185**	0.032	0.067	0.140*	0.084^	–0.021
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.067)
ANES Egalitarianism	–0.389**	–0.390**	0.022	–0.249**	–0.008	–0.033	0.080	0.068
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.063)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.079)
ANES Moral Traditionalism	0.062	0.143**	0.062	0.143^	0.639**	0.379**	0.415**	0.708**
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.054)	(0.072)
Autonomy–Indep. Goal Attainment subscale	–0.004	–0.077	0.145^	0.072	0.001	0.056	0.024	0.040
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.073)	(0.098)
Autonomy–Sensitivity to others' control subscale	0.084	0.002	0.143^	0.048	–0.064	–0.069	–0.040	–0.057
	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.098)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.070)	(0.094)
Male Role Norms Scale–Status subscale	–0.070	–0.053	–0.139*	–0.070	–0.081	–0.161*	0.009	–0.110
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.092)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.066)	(0.088)
Male Role Norms Scale–Toughness subscale	0.029	0.055	0.133^	0.309**	–0.050	0.092	0.005	0.032
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.077)	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.072)	(0.096)
Male Role Norms Scale–Antifemininity subscale	–0.017	–0.057	–0.161*	–0.049	0.128^	0.206**	0.216**	0.254**
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.092)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.066)	(0.088)
Republican	0.011	0.048	0.060	–0.027	0.094*	0.107**	0.057	0.180**
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.046)
Democrat	0.011	0.043^	0.002	–0.098**	–0.021	–0.027	–0.003	–0.022
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Student	0.040	0.029	0.034	0.003	–0.014	0.019	–0.015	–0.019
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.033)
African American	–0.049	–0.015	0.119**	–0.001	0.148**	0.132**	0.087*	0.132*
	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.056)
Asian	–0.008	0.036	0.063	–0.055	0.131**	0.051	0.008	0.022
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.055)
Latino	0.019	–0.018	–0.012	–0.068	0.023	0.069	0.024	0.045
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.054)
South (Deep and Peripheral)	0.016	–0.011	–0.036	0.008	0.018	0.016	0.039^	0.034
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Income	0.017	0.022^	0.013	–0.003	0.001	–0.016	0.018	0.013
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.017)
College graduate	0.046*	0.040*	–0.005	–0.090**	–0.019	0.056*	–0.022	–0.040
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.027)
Female	0.003	–0.021	0.048^	0.018	0.012	–0.012	0.010	0.043
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Intercept	0.382**	0.452**	0.277**	0.345**	–0.052	–0.003	–0.159^	–0.174
	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.096)	(0.125)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.120)
N	467	473	482	481	480	483	482	483
r2	0.54	0.55	0.24	0.31	0.40	0.35	0.34	0.39
rmse	0.21	0.20	0.23	0.30	0.24	0.25	0.21	0.29

** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed

Table 4: Foreign Policy

	Increase defense spending	*Afghan war worth the cost*	*Afghan war decreased terror threat*	*Take firm stand in Ukraine*
ANES Limited Government	–0.021	–0.119**	0.011	–0.089
	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.068)
ANES Economic Individualism	0.167**	0.085	0.030	0.019
	(0.052)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.110)
ANES Racial Resentment	0.053	–0.092	–0.026	–0.205^
	(0.053)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.112)
ANES Egalitarianism	–0.073	–0.286**	–0.233**	–0.045
	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.132)
ANES Moral Traditionalism	0.309**	0.378**	0.081	0.277*
	(0.057)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.122)
Autonomy–Indep. Goal Attainment subscale	–0.001	0.022	–0.030	0.013
	(0.077)	(0.112)	(0.110)	(0.168)
Autonomy–Sensitivity to others' control subscale	0.000	–0.030	0.031	–0.112
	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.158)
Male Role Norms Scale–Status subscale	0.064	–0.002	0.072	–0.202
	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.149)
Male Role Norms Scale–Toughness subscale	–0.054	–0.011	–0.100	–0.124
	(0.076)	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.167)
Male Role Norms Scale–Antifemininity subscale	–0.017	0.045	0.069	0.164
	(0.070)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.149)
Republican	0.128**	0.120*	0.065	0.157*
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.078)
Democrat	–0.023	0.009	0.043	0.079
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.053)
Student	–0.037	0.035	0.021	0.003
	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.058)
African American	0.087*	0.033	0.003	0.006
	(0.044)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.098)
Asian	0.008	–0.038	0.028	0.218*
	(0.043)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.096)
Latino	–0.024	0.014	0.057	0.173^
	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.091)
South (Deep and Peripheral)	0.018	0.080*	0.058^	0.078
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.049)
Income	0.021	0.045*	0.026	0.045
	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.029)
College graduate	–0.010	0.041	–0.010	0.058
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.046)
Female	0.061*	0.003	–0.048	–0.028
	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.053)
Intercept	0.041	0.113	0.488**	0.338^
	(0.095)	(0.137)	(0.136)	(0.204)
N	482	480	482	418
r2	0.29	0.19	0.09	0.10
rmse	0.22	0.33	0.32	0.45

** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ p<0.10 two tailed


Domestic Policy
Oppose govt effort on jobs & std of living
Cut spending, fewer services
Deficit important
Loosen gun laws
Oppose same sex marriage
Oppose antidiscrimination laws for gays/lesbians
Oppose gays in military
Oppose gay/lesbian adoption
ANES Limited Government
ANES Economic Individualism
ANES Racial Resentment
ANES Egalitarianism
ANES Moral Traditionalism
Autonomy--Indep. Goal Attainment subscale
Autonomy--Sensitivity to others' control subscale
Male Role Norms Scale--Status subscale
Male Role Norms Scale--Toughness subscale
Male Role Norms Scale--Antifemininity subscale
-.5
-.25
0
.25
.5
Parameter estimate


Foreign Policy
Increase defense spending
Afghan war worth the cost
Afghan war decreased terror threat
Take firm stand in Ukraine
ANES Limited Government
ANES Economic Individualism
ANES Racial Resentment
ANES Egalitarianism
ANES Moral Traditionalism
Autonomy--Indep. Goal Attainment subscale
Autonomy--Sensitivity to others' control subscale
Male Role Norms Scale--Status subscale
Male Role Norms Scale--Toughness subscale
Male Role Norms Scale--Antifemininity subscale
-.5
-.25
0
.25
.5
Parameter estimate

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